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INTRODUCTION 
On Tuesday, May 20, 2008, the National Football League (the 
“NFL” or the “League”) officially notified the National Football 
League Players’ Association (the “NFLPA,” the “Players’ 
Association” or the “Union”) that ownership (the “Owners” or 
“Ownership”) had elected to opt out of the parties’ current 
collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA” or the “Agreement”).1  
This decision threatens nearly two decades of uninterrupted labor 
peace and mutual financial gains.  In 2006, Owners capitulated to 
Union demands, as they hastily ratified the CBA during an 
emergency meeting in the interest of maintaining steadily climbing 
League revenues.2  This action by Owners was intended to avoid a 
work stoppage, which would have derailed the continuing 
economic success professional football had enjoyed.  The chief 
concession was to allocate an additional percentage of League 
revenues to player salaries,3 which under the 2006 CBA now 
 
 1 John Clayton, NFL Owners Vote Unanimously to Opt Out of Labor Deal, 
ESPN.COM, May 20, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3404596.  
 2 Vito Stellino, NFL Confidential: Goodell’s Hands Full with Heavy Contract Issues, 
FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 13, 2006, http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/081306 
/jag_4408901.shtml (noting that “labor peace was more important than having a labor 
strike or Armageddon” (quoting Jacksonville Jaguars owner, Wayne Weaver)). 
 3 Id. 
C08_LEVINE-MARAVENT_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2010  1:03 PM 
1422 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1419 
approached 60% of League gross revenues.  In signing the 
agreement, Ownership seemed more concerned with preserving 
labor peace than considering the long-term consequences of the 
future. 
As the situation stands today, skyrocketing player salaries and 
a severe recession have drastically altered Ownership’s opinion of 
the CBA.  Despite league-wide revenues approaching a healthy $9 
billion,4 Ownership has taken the position that the 2006 CBA 
allocated too high a percentage of revenues to players and now 
threatens the NFL’s economic viability.5  Said one owner, “[i]t’s a 
bad deal.  A lot of people realize that now.”6 
The NFLPA expected Ownership to opt out of the CBA in 
2008.7  Now, the Union is unifying its front after the passing of the 
Players’ Association’s longtime and seminal Executive Director, 
Gene Upshaw.  Shortly before passing, Mr. Upshaw had 
commented on the League’s rationale for opting out, saying “[j]ust 
because the owners did not make as much as they wanted, they feel 
they lost money.  We are not going to retreat [from a higher 
allocation of revenues] and we are not going to take less.”8 
When the NFL opted out, Commissioner Roger Goodell sent 
Upshaw an email providing three reasons why the League had 
exercised its option to reopen the contract for negotiation.  Goodell 
pointed to (1) high labor costs (an unacceptable percentage of 
League revenues being allocated to paying player salaries); (2) 
problems with NFL rookie salaries (exorbitant contracts to 
unproven players); and (3) the legal inability of franchises to 
recoup signing bonuses from players who breach contracts or 
refuse to perform (including issues with player discipline).9  
Commissioner Goodell also stated in separate comments that it is 
 
 4 Mark Maske, Owners May Revisit NFL Labor Issues, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2008,  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/18/AR2008031802 
995.html. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Clayton, supra note 1. 
 8 Gene Upshaw, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Panel Address at 
the Sports Lawyers Conference (May 2008). 
 9 Ron Borges, Vrabel: There’s a Place for More Pay, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 9, 2008, 
http://www.bostonherald.com/sports/football/patriots/view.bg?articleid=1131071. 
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“very clear . . . that the [O]wnership doesn’t believe that this deal 
is working.”10  While the NFL was not suffering undue financial 
hardship, Ownership recognized that player salaries needed to be 
curbed.11  Thus, opting out of the 2006 CBA and bargaining to sign 
a more favorable accord became the League’s new cost 
containment strategy. 
In response, the NFLPA sought to determine the value of NFL 
franchises to gauge the Owners’ profits.  The NFLPA 
commissioned a study that found “the average value of an NFL 
franchise in the last [ten] years has risen from $288 [million] to 
$1.04 [billion], increasing at a compound annual rate of 13.7%.”12  
The League questioned the accuracy of this study, considering the 
only franchise data was from the Green Bay Packers, who are the 
League’s only publicly owned franchise.13  As illustrated, both 
sides have a sharply contrasting picture about the financial 
viability of the NFL; one should expect a long, protracted and 
contentious labor dispute if a new CBA is not in place before the 
completion of the 2010 season.14 
 
 10 Mark Maske, NFL Owners Want New Deal, WASH. POST, May 21, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/20m08/05/20/AR200805200 
1693.html.  
 11 See id.  In his statement to the press, Goodell chose his words carefully, as such 
wording is important when discussing finances and an employer’s ability to pay. Id. 
 12 NFLPA Addresses Stagnent CBA Negotiations with NFL Owners, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/ 
127349; see also KEVIN M. MURPHY & ROBERT H. TOPEL, THE ECONOMICS OF NFL TEAM 
OWNERSHIP 8–9 (2009), available at http://www.rodneyfort.com/PHSportsEcon/ 
Common/LinksandFun/LinksFun04/FINAL%20-%20The%20Economics%20of%20 
NFL%20Team%20Ownership.pdf.  
 13 Forbes recently estimated that the Saint Louis Rams franchise was valued at $931 
million, twenty-fifth out of the thirty-one NFL teams. Michael K. Ozanian, Rams Rushing 
Toward New Ownership?, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2009, http://blogs.forbes.com/sportsmoney 
blog/2009/10/rams-rushing-toward-new-ownership/. 
 14 Attempts to publically address the growing labor conflict have turned contentious.  
Rhetoric between the parties seems to be escalating and both sides have even taken to 
social media to argue specifically about disclosure of financial information. See, e.g., 
Profile of Greg Aiello, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/gregaiello (last visited Dec. 28, 2009) 
(League spokesman); Profile of George Atallah, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/GAtallah 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2009) (NFLPA spokesperson); see also Sean Leahy, NFL, NFLPA 
Spokesmen Trade ‘Fun Facts’ About CBA on Twitter, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2009, 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2009/10/nfl-nflpa-spokesmen-
trade-fun-facts-about-cba-on-twitter/1?csp=34. 
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Both labor and management are making personnel-related and 
financial preparations for a protracted labor dispute.  One move 
that increases the likelihood of a prolonged labor dispute is the 
NFL’s decision to hire veteran labor attorney Bob Batterman.  
Batterman, as National Hockey League (the “NHL”) outside 
counsel, was intimately involved with planning the NHL’s strategy 
in its labor dispute with the National Hockey League Players 
Association (the “NHLPA”).15  During this work stoppage, the 
NHL locked players out to achieve this “cost certainty.”16  This 
directly translated into cutting player salaries and installing a “hard 
salary cap.”17  The NHL ultimately sacrificed a full season of 
hockey to achieve cost certainty.  However, it is unclear whether 
this lost year was in the best interest of hockey.  The NFL may be 
using Batterman’s NHL labor strategy as a blueprint for its own 
approach to dealing with the Union.  The question remains whether 
this same strategy, when employed against a more powerful union 
like the NFLPA, will achieve a result that is in the best interest of 
professional football. 
With the addition of Batterman, it is unclear whether the NFL 
will implement a similar hard-line strategy utilized by the NHL or 
whether the parties will strike a more reconciliatory tone.  
However, considering the parties’ bargaining history is important 
when evaluating the NFL’s bargaining strategy.18  This Comment 
examines the material issues and likely arguments regarding the 
 
 15 “‘Batterman bullied [the union] into submission,’ says one sports labor lawyer who 
requested anonymity.  ‘If one accepts the conspiracy theory of collective bargaining, this 
means the NFL must be looking for trouble,’ says another.” See Brian Baxter, 
Proskauer’s Bob Batterman Signals a Labor War in the NFL, AMLAW DAILY (May 21, 
2008), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/05/smashmouth----p.html 
(alteration in original). 
 16 See Joshua Liebman, Tip Your “Cap” to the Players: 2007–2008 Off-Season 
Reveals NHL’s Salary Cap Benefits on Players, 16 SPORTS LAW. J. 81, 92 (2009) 
(mentioning “cost certainty” via potentially implementing a salary cap linked to league 
revenues); see also Roger I. Abrams, Sports Law Issues Just over the Horizon, 3 VA. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 49, 61 (2003) (describing Commissioner Bettman having a steadfast 
adherence to the goal of “cost certainty” in discussing the NHL inevitable conflict with 
the NHLPA). 
 17 A “hard salary cap” prohibits teams from having payrolls in excess of a mandated 
number.  If a team goes over the salary cap, it is penalized.    
 18 The parties’ history is full of strikes and lockouts. See infra Part II. 
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looming NFL-NFLPA labor stoppage in 2011.  Part I recounts the 
origins of the NFL as well as the recent events that were material 
in leading to this labor dispute.  Part II examines the origins of the 
NFLPA.  As it is a labor stoppage that Mr. Batterman oversaw,19 
Part III recounts the NHL’s 2004 lockout.  Part IV summarizes and 
explores the major concepts of labor law, most principally the 
theory of good faith bargaining.  Part V provides a brief statement 
of the case, discusses the issues germane to this labor dispute, and 
presents arguments for both the NFL and the Union.  Part VI 
briefly discusses how an antitrust lawsuit recently decided by the 
United States Supreme Court may impact the positions of the 
parties.  Finally, Part VII provides several predictions and a 
conclusion to this Comment. 
This Comment recounts the origins of both the NFL and the 
PA, providing great detail into the bargaining process between the 
two entities from 1950 until 1993.  This level of detail is necessary 
because the most effective method to determine a party’s sincerity 
in good faith bargaining, which is a paramount concept in labor 
law,20 is to keep in context the bargaining history of the parties.  
This history may influence the level of contentiousness amongst 
the parties and their sincerity to reach an agreement. 
I. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
A. NFL Origins 
A league with humble beginnings, the National Football 
League was born in an Ohio automobile showroom in 1920.21  The 
NFL enjoyed a period of modest growth while trying to find its 
way onto solid financial ground after being resurrected from the 
 
 19 The NFL may also be basing its strategy in a similar vein as the NHL, who 
attributed the year of lost hockey to the sport’s dire need to achieve “cost certainty.”  
Thus, it may be foreseeable that the NFL, by bringing in Batterman, is seeking to use the 
NHL’s strategy as a blueprint for management’s handling of this upcoming labor 
stoppage. 
 20 See infra text accompanying note 246. 
 21 DAVID HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NFL 12 (Bantam Books 
1986). 
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defunct “American Professional Football Association.”22  The 
League found its footing under Commissioner Bert Bell’s sturdy 
leadership.23  He implemented measures such as the rookie player 
draft24 and recognized the power of televising games.25  However, 
professional football truly began to make strides with the rise of 
Commissioner Pete Rozelle.  The legendary commissioner’s 
leadership was instrumental in convincing team executives to make 
decisions that promoted the best interests of the League.26  This 
thinking led to major results such as harnessing the power of 
television for the benefit of the entire NFL.27 
Rozelle convinced owners in large markets, such as New York 
Giants owner Wellington Mara, to forego lucrative local television 
contracts in favor of a deal that equally benefited every franchise.28  
Owners embraced Rozelle’s “league think” ideology29 to pool 
individual team television broadcasting rights and leverage them 
into several large contracts.  One deal was signed with CBS; the 
other with NBC.  Over time, broadcasting contracts provided the 
financial security member franchises desperately sought.30  More 
importantly, these contracts served as a foundation to allow the 
NFL to find economic and competitive parity amongst its clubs.31 
 
 22 MARK YOST, TAILGATING, SACKS AND SALARY CAPS: HOW THE NFL BECAME THE 
MOST SUCCESSFUL SPORTS LEAGUE IN HISTORY 53 (Kaplan Publishing 2006). 
 23 See Biography: Bert Bell, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, http://www.profootball 
hof.com/hof/member.aspx? PLAYER_ID=23 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). 
 24 YOST, supra note 22, at 55. 
 25 Although Bert Bell was the first commissioner to put NFL games on television, 
Alvin “Pete” Rozelle would be the first commissioner in sports to fully utilize the power 
of television. See id. at 63. 
 26 “Rozelle surmised that the NFL’s future depended on every NFL owner—from the 
wealthiest and most profitable to the neediest and most owing—perceiving his or her 
equity stake as vitally interconnected, with one team’s economic failures threatening all 
others.” See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape 
Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 731–32 (2010) (citing a New York Times article by David 
Harris detailing how “Rozelle persuaded his employers that the key to marketing the 
NFL’s product was maintaining a consistently high level of competition among all the 
clubs”). 
 27 The first NFL television broadcast occurred in 1939. 
 28 This occurred in 1962. 
 29 HARRIS, supra note 21, at 13. 
 30 YOST, supra note 22, at 63–64. 
 31 Id. 
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The NFL faced continuous competition from rival leagues 
because of its financial success.32  While it faced competition from 
multiple upstart leagues, the greatest challenge came from the 
American Football League (the “AFL”).  The AFL was founded in 
1959 after charter owner Lamar Hunt was denied an NFL 
franchise.33  It was Hunt’s AFL that demonstrated the potential 
value of pooling a league’s collective broadcast rights, as he built 
the AFL around its national television contract with ABC.34  The 
NFL was unsuccessful in its effort to weaken the AFL, so the NFL 
took a different route.  After a series of secret meetings between 
the two rival leagues35 that required receiving congressional 
approval for the action,36 the AFL merged into the NFL.  This new 
NFL now boasted a twenty-four-member league and would expand 
up to thirty member teams soon thereafter.37  Thus, the NFL was 
poised to take on baseball for supremacy amongst the American 
sports consumer. 
B. Modern NFL and Issues 
The NFL continued its success after Rozelle retired in 1989.  
Paul Tagliabue succeeded Rozelle as commissioner and 
implemented a strategy to increase League revenues through 
stadium construction.38  During his term, Tagliabue oversaw an 
ambitious League initiative of stadium construction and 
refurbishment and also presided over almost two decades of 
uninterrupted labor peace between the NFL and NFLPA.  While 
 
 32 Competitors include The All-American Football Conference (the “AAFC”), 1946–
49; The American Football League (the “AFL”), 1960–69; The World Football League 
(the “WFL”), 1974–75; The United States Football League (the “USFL”), 1983–86; The 
Canadian Football League (the “CFL”), as it had a brief presence in the United States, 
(1993–95); The Extreme Football League (the “XFL”), 2000–01; and The Arena Football 
League (the “AFL”), 1987–present. 
 33 Matthew Levine, Despite His Antics, T.O. Has a Valid Point: Why NFL Players 
Deserve a Bigger Piece of the Pie, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 425, 431 (2006). 
 34 YOST, supra note 22, at 73. 
 35 See NFL History by Decade, 1961–1970, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/history/ 
chronology/1961-1970 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010) [hereinafter NFL History by Decade]. 
 36 HARRIS, supra note 21, at 17. 
 37 NFL History by Decade, supra note 35. 
 38 At the League’s 1994 winter meetings, Tagliabue urged owners to focus on stadiums 
as a high priority. YOST, supra note 22, at 190–91.  
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these two accomplishments did much to cement a positive legacy 
for Tagliabue, he is also increasingly being blamed by Ownership 
for the NFL’s agreeing to the 2006 CBA.39  It was Tagliabue who 
urged Ownership to sign a CBA that seemingly mortgaged the 
NFL’s future in order to allow the commissioner to retire from his 
position without incident.40  This forced Tagliabue’s successor, 
Roger Goodell, to handle the uncertainties of the future. 
C. Negotiating the 2006 CBA 
During the 2006 negotiations, Owners seemingly believed that 
preserving lasting labor peace was too immense to jeopardize with 
a potential labor stoppage.  Not wanting his legacy tarnished by 
retiring just as labor unrest was developing, Tagliabue lobbied 
Ownership to accept the deal.  The Agreement was negotiated 
within a matter of weeks, culminating in an eleventh-hour 
deliberation and decision by Ownership to accept the Union’s 
proposal.41  At the time of the agreement, Rozelle’s “league think” 
ideology seemed to be back in place.  Both labor and management 
seemingly acted in the best interests of the game by preserving 
labor peace and the massive financial revenues that are now a 
staple of professional football.42  However, even at this time where 
both parties’ interests seemed aligned, the CBA failed to address 
several areas of concern for the League: high player salaries and 
escalating rookie salary structures.  In fact, the CBA was modified 
to allocate more revenue for player salaries.43 
 
 39 See Thomas George, Owner’s Meetings Could Foreshadow Labor Strife, NFL.COM, 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80772c56&template=with-video&confirm 
=true (last visited Sept. 2, 2010). 
 40 Id. 
 41 The proposal was approved by Ownership 30–2 (the Bills and Bengals dissented). 
Jarrett Bell, NFL Owners Accept Player Union Proposal with 30–2 Vote, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2006-03-08-labor_x.htm. 
 42 “This agreement is not about one side winning or losing,” said Executive Director 
Upshaw in a statement.  “Ultimately, it is about what is best for the players, the owners 
and the fans of the National Football League.” See NFL Owners Approve Six-Year CBA 
Extension, ESPN.COM, Mar. 9, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id 
=2360258 [hereinafter NFL Owners Approve]. 
 43 See Chris Deubert & Glen M. Wong, Understanding the Evolution of Signing 
Bonuses and Guaranteed Money in the National Football League: Preparing for the 
2011 Collective Bargaining Negotiations, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 179, 181–82 (2009). 
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Some Owners were dissatisfied with the 2006 CBA even 
though it ensured short-term labor peace.  Buffalo Bills owner 
Ralph Wilson questioned whether management acted too hastily 
without carefully deliberating its future economic consequences.  
Wilson felt that Ownership lacked a clear grasp on several issues 
covered in the proposed CBA.44  It was especially unclear how the 
new CBA was going to solve the revenue sharing disparity 
amongst clubs.  “I didn’t understand [the revenue sharing sections 
of the 2006 CBA] . . . it is a very complicated issue and I didn’t 
believe we should [have] rush[ed] to vote in [forty-five] 
minutes,”45 said Wilson.  League competitive balance depends on a 
successful revenue sharing policy.46  Small market teams such as 
Buffalo and Indianapolis depend on shared revenue to maintain 
financial viability, an essential element to preserve the competitive 
balance of the League.47 
Despite objections, both sides generally thought that the 2006 
CBA adequately addressed the increasing revenue disparity 
between clubs due to a variety of its provisions.  Under the 
agreement, the top fifteen revenue-producing teams pledged to 
contribute about $900 million to a shared pool over the life of the 
CBA.48  Those funds would then be equally distributed to lower 
revenue-generating franchises per the CBA.49  The new deal also 
increased the revenue sharing pool from $40 million to 
approximately $100 million annually.50 
One omission from the 2006 CBA was that this revenue 
sharing provision did not adequately address the millions of 
unshared dollars in revenue streams derived by savvy owners 
through creative use of team stadiums.  When the 1993 CBA was 
 
 44 See NFL Owners Approve, supra note 42. 
 45 Id. 
 46 George, supra note 39. 
 47 Deubert & Wong, supra note 43, at 182. 
 48 See Don Pierson, There’s Peace on Turf in NFL; 6-Year Accord Raises Salary Cap, 
Revenue Sharing, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 2006, at C1. 
 49 Each one of the NFL’s top fifteen top revenue producing-teams was required to give 
even more money to less financially stable owners in addition to sharing revenue with the 
NFLPA. See id. 
 50 See Mark Maske, NFL Appears Headed Toward a Season Without a Cap, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 30, 2009, at D3 [hereinafter Maske, NFL Appears]. 
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signed, stadiums generated almost no revenues,51 and thus, there 
was no need to include stadium revenues into the CBA as shared 
revenue.  However, stadium revenues now account for about 20% 
of league-wide revenue.52  Savvy NFL owners leverage the name-
recognition power of their franchises by creating additional 
revenue streams through new or refurbished stadia.  However, 
these new streams,53 along with increasingly more creative 
sponsorship methods, are contra to the core NFL league think 
ideology.54  An uneven increase in unshared team revenues 
threatens the competitive balance and viability of the League.  Any 
injury to the League is also felt by its chief employees: the players. 
II. THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 
A. From Clean Uniforms to a Piece of the Pie 
The National Football League Players Association began in 
earnest in 1956.55  Members of the Green Bay Packers and 
Cleveland Browns were in search of a few simple guarantees from 
management, such as clean uniforms and payment of salaries to 
injured players.56  Players eventually enlisted the assistance of 
attorney Creighton Miller, a former NFL player and team general 
manager.57  Players throughout the NFL signed authorization cards 
 
51  In the early 1990s, an average NFL team’s stadium revenues were roughly 10% of 
its total revenue. YOST, supra note 22, at 6. 
52  Id. 
53  Revenue streams may include premium club seating, luxury suites, stadium clubs, 
and personal seat licenses.  Personal seat licenses, or PSLs, are a one-time fee that fans 
pay in exchange for the privilege to buy a season ticket. Id. at 6. 
54  As one NFL owner contended, unshared revenues generated by new or refurbished 
stadia provide teams with “an extra pool of cash that could be used to compensate players 
above, beyond, and ‘around’ the salary cap limitations.” Id. at 10–11 (presenting the 
small market prospective in the unshared revenue debate). 
55  History, The Beginning—1956, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflplayers. 
com/About-us/History (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
56  History of the NFLPA, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflplayers.com/ 
About-us/History (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter NFLPA History].  Additionally, 
players demanded a minimum salary and that management pay for players’ equipment. 
Id. 
57  Id. 
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and, by November 1956, Miller became their leader.58  This effort 
led to the creation of the NFLPA, which represented National 
Football League players in their collective bargaining efforts.59 
Ownership initially balked at the Players’ Association’s 
attempts at collective bargaining.  Players, fearful of owner reprisal 
due to frowned-upon union involvement, held secret meetings to 
plan a strike.60  Fear of owner reprisal was justified; one owner 
stated to his team members that if they struck, he would simply 
play the game without them.61  The players quickly capitulated, 
realizing that negotiating leverage was squarely with 
management.62 
Player mobility was a cardinal issue long before any football 
union was formed.  Since no leverage existed to bargain, players 
opted to litigate the issue.  The first notable player lawsuit was Bill 
Radovich’s 1957 challenge under the Sherman Antitrust Act.  The 
Detroit Lions nose guard claimed that the NFL’s refusal to allow 
his request to move from Detroit to California to be near an ill 
family member was a restraint of trade.63  The NFL argued that the 
League was immune from an antitrust challenge, citing the 
Supreme Court’s exemption of Major League Baseball from the 
Sherman Act.64  The Supreme Court instead sided with Radovich, 
holding that football did not have the same antitrust exemption that 
Major League Baseball enjoyed.65  This favorable ruling gave the 
Players’ Association an important victory that the Union could use 
as leverage in negotiations with Ownership.  Although Radovich 
was a significant victory, the Players’ Association failed to take 
advantage by challenging other fundamental NFL concepts.66 
 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  ROBERT C. BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 124 (Auburn 
House Publishing Co. 1986). 
61  Id.  The individual threatening reprisal was Washington Redskins’ owner, George 
Preston Marshall. Id. 
62  Id. 
63  Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 447–48 (1957). 
64  Id. at 449–50. 
65  See id. at 451–54; see also McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197 (6th 
Cir. 1979) (finding that the NHL’s reserve system was subject to antitrust scrutiny). 
66  MICHAEL ORIARD, BRAND NFL: MAKING AND SELLING AMERICA’S FAVORITE SPORTS 
57 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2007). 
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The next decade brought a new challenge to League owners as 
they were forced to deal with the upstart American Football 
League.  After these leagues merged in 1966, player solidarity 
became a significant issue of concern for the Union.67  NFL player 
representatives faced the task of representing all members that had 
merged into the League.  The Players’ Association only 
represented sixteen of the twenty-six team rosters in the League at 
this point.68  The players sought guidance from the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (the 
“AFL-CIO”) to assist in forming a labor union of professional 
athletes.69 The AFL-CIO was not interested, and neither was 
Creighton Miller.70  As a result, the players voted to remain an 
association instead of a union.  The NFL responded by refusing to 
negotiate with the players.71  Knowing the Players’ Association 
was weak, in 1968, Ownership locked out the players.72  The 
weeklong labor stoppage resulted in the first-ever NFL-NFLPA 




67  Id. at 58. 
68  The 1960’s—AFL/NFL Competition, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nfl 
players.com/About-us/History (last visited Dec. 29, 2009) [hereinafter NFLPA in the 
1960s]. 
69  NFLPA History, supra note 56.  
70  Id.  The players also rejected overtures from the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters to organize. ORIARD, supra note 66, at 58. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  The CBA embodied less than the teams had hoped for, as player-representatives 
accepted Ownership’s terms without first consulting the Association. NFLPA in the 
1960s, supra note 68.   
The agreement called for far less than the NFLPA had hoped to 
achieve. Included in the demands were minimum salaries of $15,000 
for rookies and $20,000 for veterans, exhibition game pay of $500 
per game, lowering retirement age to 45, and impartial grievance 
arbitration. But, under the contract eventually agreed to, minimum 
salary remained at $9,000 for rookies and $10,000 for veterans, 
exhibition game pay stayed at $50 per game, the commissioner 
remained as the arbitrator, and retirement age stayed at 65.  
Id. 
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B. A Cat and Mouse Game—Negotiations Between the NFL and 
NFLPA 
Players took a significant step toward achieving cohesiveness 
by consolidating the NFL and AFL Players Associations into one 
Players’ Association in 1970.75  While both NFL and AFL loyalists 
pushed for their respective union leaders to be the Union’s first-
ever president, Baltimore Colts tight end John Mackey was 
eventually selected.76  With its new leader, the Players’ 
Association was ready to engage Ownership in a new round of 
negotiations. 
Ownership seemed receptive to recognize and meet with the 
Players’ Association.  However, recognition was based on several 
conditions including a promise to eliminate lawyers from being 
present during meetings and that there would be no attempts by the 
Players’ Association to negotiate increases in pre-season pay.77  A 
meeting was arranged in which two representatives from each side 
would be present.  But when the two reps for the Players’ 
Association arrived, they were greeted by an Ownership delegation 
comprised of nine individuals.78  Before the meeting started, 
Mackey was advised by his counsel to sign a contract that 
Ownership had provided.79  This document included a provision 
that would have bound the players to Ownership’s only offer “in 
perpetuity.”80  Instead of signing the document, Mackey fired his 
attorney and hired the law firm of Lindquist & Vennum.81  A 
young attorney by the name of Ed Garvey was assigned as counsel; 
shortly thereafter he left the firm and became the Players’ 
Association’s first-ever Executive Director.82 
Garvey was charged with an arduous job as the first ever NFL-
CBA expired in January 1970.  Negotiations led to a three-day 
 
75  The 1970’s—AFL and NFL Players Association Merge, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Dec. 29, 2009) [hereinafter 
NFLPA in the 1970s]. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
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players’ strike, and Ownership retaliated with a seventeen-day 
lockout.83  Eventually, Garvey secured $19.1 million in 
concessions by Ownership, which mostly came in the form of 
player pension contributions.84  Under Garvey’s direction, the 
NFLPA started bargaining for concessions that it arguably already 
should have based on the Radovich decision in 1957.  These 
bargaining issues included (1) the elimination of the amateur draft, 
(2) the elimination of the options clause, (3) the Rozelle Rule, (4) 
impartial arbitration of all disputes, (5) individual contracts to 
protect players, and (6) elimination of the waiver system.85  Under 
the Rozelle Rule, a player could change teams at the conclusion of 
his contract provided the new team compensated the old club for 
the loss of that player’s services.86  Compensation was provided to 
teams in the form of players, money, or draft picks.87  If teams 
failed to reach an agreement, Commissioner Rozelle was able to 
determine and award compensation.88  While players could 
negotiate with any team after their contract expired, the rule still 
significantly restrained player movement. 
In 1974, the Players’ Association levied sixty-three “freedom 
issues” upon the Owners, including a demand for the elimination 
of the Rozelle Rule.89  Owners feared that such a free agency 
system would ruin the League’s competitive balance, thereby 
destroying the very foundation that the League’s success was 
based upon.90  Thus, each side had drawn their lines of contention.  
Ownership attempted to send a message to the Union by only 
inviting rookies and free agents to NFL training camps.91  The 
NFLPA tried to hold its line with pickets, but solidarity was still 
 
83  BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 125. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  C. Peter Goplerud III, Collective Bargaining in the National Football League: A 
Historical and Comparative Analysis, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 16 (1997). 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  ORIARD, supra note 66, at 61.  The mantra amongst the rank-and-file players became 
“no freedom, no football.”  NFLPA in the 1970s, supra note 75. 
90  According to Rozelle, if players were “given total freedom to negotiate their 
services, the [L]eague would be dominated by a few rich teams and would eventually 
lose both fan interest and revenue.” Goplerud, supra note 86, at 16. 
91  BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 126. 
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weak.92  After one month, more than one-quarter of all players had 
crossed lines.  The strike ended after forty-four days,93 leaving the 
Union “badly split and seriously underfunded.”94  Ownership 
punished players who were significantly involved with the strike, 
illustrating that there would be consequences for individuals who 
involved themselves with the Players’ Association.95 
The NFLPA responded by filing unfair labor practice charges 
with the National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB” or the 
“Board”).96  The NLRB Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) 
ordered reinstatement of the players.97  After another failed strike 
attempt in 1975, it became apparent that Garvey’s Union was still 
weak.  Many players lacked the willingness to unite as a viable 
union.  Instead of negotiating, the Union again found redress 
through the court.98  Mackey and thirty-five other players filed suit 
against the League in Minnesota Federal District Court, claiming 
that the Rozelle Rule violated antitrust laws as a restraint on 
trade.99  The district court ruled in the Union’s favor, finding that 
the Rozelle Rule was a per se violation of the Sherman Act in the 
form of a group boycott.100  Upon appeal, the League asserted that 
the nonstatutory labor exemption101 precluded players from 
 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Goplerud, supra note 86, at 16. 
95  Three Union leaders, Bill Curry, Kermit Alexander, and Tom Keating, were either 
cut or traded by their respective NFL clubs during the 1974 strike as a consequence of 
their Players’ Association activities. BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 126. 
96  Id. 
97  Id.  Sports law commentators viewed ALJ involvement as a symptom of the Union’s 
poor negotiating leverage with the NFL. Id. 
98  See Goplerud, supra note 86, at 17 (stating that using antitrust law was “necessary 
because of the failure of the bargaining process and the strike to effectively represent the 
players’ interests, thus leaving antitrust laws as the only vehicle for challenging the 
owners’ actions”). 
99  Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Minn. 1975), rev’d 
on other grounds, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976). 
100  Id. at 1007. 
101  The nonstatutory labor exemption is a mechanism preventing antitrust scrutiny that 
survives the “expiration of a collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach an 
impasse as to that issue; thereafter, the term or condition is no longer immune from 
scrutiny under the antitrust laws, and the employer runs the risk that continued imposition 
of the condition will subject the employer to liability.” Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 
678 F. Supp. 777, 788 (D. Minn. 1988) [hereinafter Powell I], rev’d, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th 
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challenging this rule because players had collectively bargained to 
two previous CBAs that contained the Rozelle Rule.102 
The Eighth Circuit rejected the NFL’s argument and sided with 
the district court.103  However, the Eighth Circuit declined to 
follow the lower court’s ruling.  Instead, the court suggested that 
the parties collectively bargain in good faith to create a player 
movement and inter-team compensation system.104  The court 
required the parties to resolve this dispute through continued 
negotiations because the parties were better suited to determine 
their own mutual interests than the courts.105 
Despite this significant victory for free agency, support for the 
Players’ Association waned.106  In March 1977, the successor CBA 
scaled back some of the victories the Union achieved in Mackey, 
such as free agency.107  Among the additions to the 1977 CBA was 
a modified format for player movement and compensation.  Under 
this new system, players who played out their contracts could 
pursue free agency.108  However, teams had the option of matching 
a competing team’s offer or they were compensated if the player 
 
Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Powell III].  The Supreme Court has stated that limited 
nonstatutory exemptions are proper compromises, and “that in order to properly 
accommodate the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets 
with the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the National Labor 
Relations Act . . . certain union-employer agreements must be accorded a limited 
nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions.” Id. at 782 (citing Connell Constr. Co. 
v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975); Local Union 
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 
676, 689 (1965)). 
102  Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976). 
103  The court of appeals stated that the Rozelle Rule was “significantly more restrictive 
than necessary to serve any legitimate purpose[]” and “as implemented, contravene[d] the 
Rule of Reason.” Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622–23.   
104  Id. at 623. 
105  Id. 
106  NFLPA in the 1970s, supra note 75. 
107  The 1977 CBA included impartial arbitration of non-injury grievances and, instead 
of outright free agency, a modified free agency scheme that included a team’s right of 
first refusal and compensation in the event a player was lost. BERRY ET AL., supra note 
60, at 127; see also NFLPA in the 1970s, supra note 75. 
108  BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 127. 
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was lost.  This proved to be an unworkable system as few players 
changed teams.109 
Following the 1981–82 season, the NFLPA held its annual 
membership meeting in Albuquerque, New Mexico.110 Players 
increasingly showed signs of unity as approximately one-third of 
the Union’s membership (at least 537 players) attended the 
event.111  During the meetings, the players adopted a proposal that 
their compensation come from a pool of 55% of League 
revenues.112  This scheme of player compensation was based on 
years of service, playing time, and individual and team 
performance.113 
NFL management estimated that players were already 
receiving 48% of League revenue and preferred a performance- 
based salary system without seniority considerations.114  
Ownership worried that if salaries were based mostly on seniority, 
the newly formed United States Football League would then raid 
NFL talent.115  The League’s financial ability became a central 
topic of debate amongst the parties.  Jack Donlan, Executive 
Director of the NFL Management Council,116 granted the Players’ 
Association’s request to inspect the League’s finances in a January 
1982 letter.117  Ownership then reneged on this agreement and 
 
109  Powell I, 678 F. Supp. 777, 780 (D. Minn. 1988) (“[D]uring the 5-year period 
covered by the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement, fewer than 50 out of 600 players 
received offers from other NFL clubs after becoming free agents.”), rev’d, 930 F.2d 1293 
(8th Cir. 1989).  The NFLPA website described the resulting trend in practice:  
Although the new free agent system made sense in theory, since it 
geared draft choice compensation to new salary offers made to the 
free agent player, it did not anticipate the huge increases in club 
revenues—and therefore salaries for players—which began occurring 
one year after the 1977 CBA was signed.  As a result, most players 
were “worth” more than a first-round choice when they became free 
agents. 
NFLPA in the 1970s, supra note 75. 
110  NFLPA History, supra note 56. 
111  BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 130. 
112  NFLPA History, supra note 56. 
113  Id. 
114  BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 131, 134. 
 115 Id. 
 116 The NFL Management Council is the NFL’s labor relations unit. 
 117 BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 131. 
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instead proposed an anonymous audit for an average team.118  The 
Union challenged Ownership’s refusal to provide financial 
information through the NLRB.119  The Board upheld the League’s 
position because the Union had no definitive basis from which to 
demand 55% of the League’s gross revenues.120  This setback 
meant the Union would have to take other action. 
The Union continued with its plans to strike as the 1982 season 
inched closer.  Players joined hands prior to the start of each 
preseason contest as a showing of solidarity, an action that drew 
the ire of team owners.121  Four days prior to the regular season, 
Ownership tendered a counter-offer to the Union that included 
what was labeled as “$600 million in new money.”122  This 
proposal broke down as $40 million in player benefits, $126 
million in career adjustment bonuses for veterans, and $475 
million for player salaries with the goal of increasing pay by 15% 
per year during the agreement.123  Players would receive 
retroactive annual increases of $10,000 for each season of player 
participation between 1977 and 1982, and an additional $10,000 
per each year played between 1983 and 1986.124  The NFLPA 
rejected the revenue sharing agreement but kept the proposal’s 
benefits and wage adjustments, proposing that $1.06 billion come 
from 50% of the League’s television deal money.125  Ownership 
rebuffed this proposal. 
In response, the Union voted to strike after week two.126  The 
League, in response, shut down team operations and barred players 
 
 118 See id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 The Union’s challenge was not a complete loss, however, as the NLRB’s General 
Counsel ordered the League to provide the Union with some of the information it 
requested.  This sought-after information included broadcast contracts, players’ salaries, 
and workers compensation insofar as knowing whether team doctors had financial 
interests in the NFL clubs.  While the Players’ Association did in fact receive some of the 
requested data, it fell short of full financial disclosure. Id. 
 121 The Owners considered fining the players. Id. at 136. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 136–37. 
 125 Id. at 137. 
 126 Id.; see also The 1980’s—Era of Change, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/History (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) [hereinafter 
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from entering team facilities for any reason.127  Ownership also 
said that players would not be paid for any additional games on the 
schedule and would no longer receive medical treatment at team 
facilities.128  Thus, both the Union and the League utilized their 
available weapons, the strike and the lockout, during the 
bargaining process. 
A contentious relationship between lead negotiators further 
complicated the bargaining process.  The relationship between 
Garvey and Donlan was so volatile that there was widespread 
distrust among the parties, clouding whether a compromise could 
be reached.129  Ownership only modified its stance twice: one 
week into and then again forty days into the strike.130  The Players’ 
Association rejected both proposals.131  On the forty-fifth day of 
the strike,132 Ownership offered what was labeled “money now” 
bonuses133 to all players who had played at least three games into 
their fourth season.  The bonuses were to be payable at the time a 
new CBA was signed.134  Ownership made a calculated move by 
guaranteeing money to veteran players, a significant part of the 
bargaining unit.135 
The parties tentatively reached an agreement on November 16, 
1982 and signed the new CBA on December 5, 1982 after another 
three weeks of negotiations.136  In the new agreement, players 
received their “money now” bonuses in the form of $60 million 
from Ownership at the time the agreement was signed.137  Players 
gained increases in minimum salary, pension pay, and pre-season 
 
NFLPA in the 1980s].  Garvey classified the players’ strike as an unfair practice strike as 
opposed to an economic strike, meaning that the NFL was violating the Players’ rights, 
which gave rise to their right to strike without punishment. BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, 
at 137. 
 127 BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 137. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 138. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 This date was more than seven weeks into the sixteen-game regular season. 
 133 The bonus offered to players in this instance was $60,000.00. 
 134 BERRY ET AL., supra note 60, at 138. 
 135 See id. 
 136 NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126. 
 137 Id. 
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pay, and also the right to a second medical opinion, the right to 
select a surgeon for injury-related operations, and the right to 
inspect their club medical records.138  Yet still missing from the 
new CBA was the true free agency scheme that much of the 
NFLPA coveted.139 
C. The NFLPA Finds a New Leader and Fights for True Free 
Agency 
During the life of the 1982 CBA negotiations, Ed Garvey left 
his post as Executive Director and the Union elected former all-pro 
guard Gene Upshaw in June 1983.140  When Union membership 
was polled for key issues heading into negotiations for the 1987 
CBA, the results clearly indicated that free agency was the 
“highest priority.”141  The player mobility provisions of the prior 
accord had been woefully ineffective, as “during the five year 
period covered by the 1982 CBA, not a single veteran player 
moved from one NFL club to another under the Right of First 
Refusal/Compensation system.”142  While Upshaw was making his 
rounds with the players and gathering important information for 
the upcoming negotiations, Ownership was readying for another 
labor stoppage.  The League made arrangements to secure a $150 
million line of credit for just such an event.143  This time, 
Ownership appeared to possess even greater negotiating 
leverage.144 
The parties returned to the bargaining table to negotiate a 
successor agreement to the 1982 CBA and made little progress.  
Ownership quickly rejected the Union’s proposal for free agency 
and although they still hoped for a compromise, players voted to 
 
 138 Id. 
 139 Goplerud, supra note 86, at 25. 
 140 NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Powell I, 678 F. Supp. 777, 781 n.6 (D. Minn. 1988) (stating that “[o]f the 1,415 
players who became veteran free agents during the term of the 1982 Agreement . . . , 
apparently only one player even received an offer from another club”), rev’d, 930 F.2d 
1293 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 143 PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 248 (Paul F. 
Clark, John T. Delaney & Ann C. Frost eds., Indus. Relations Research Ass’n 2002). 
 144 Id. 
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strike.145  The League did not capitulate to Union demands and 
instead hired replacement players.146  Games were played with 
replacement players and television ratings suffered due to inferior 
play, but they continued to be televised in order for the networks to 
fulfill their contractual obligations.  The Players’ Association knew 
that a strike would not work if the Owners were willing to replace 
the on-the-field product with “inferior talent.”147  Accordingly, 
after just a few weeks, the Union voted to end its strike on October 
15, 1987.148 
Ownership’s leverage negated the Players’ Association’s 
ability to wage an effective campaign through a strike.  The Union 
instead opted for litigation.  On October 15, 1987, the last day of 
its strike, the Players’ Association filed an antitrust lawsuit against 
the League in United States Federal Court challenging, among 
other practices, the League’s commissioner-determined right of 
first refusal compensation system.149  The Union argued that the 
NFL’s method of free agency violated section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act because it was an unreasonable restraint on trade.150  
The League filed its own motion, asking the court to declare that 
resolving the free agency issue can only occur “within the context 
of the national labor laws, and that the nonstatutory ‘labor 
exemption’ insulates the challenged restraints from antitrust 
scrutiny.”151 
The district court ruled that the nonstatutory labor exemption 
did in fact insulate the League’s right of first refusal/compensation 
 
 145 Goplerud, supra note 86, at 26–27; see also NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126. 
 146 According to the Union, “[t]he NFL Management Council Executive Committee 
(“CEC”) . . . believed that the [L]eague had been too soft on players in 1982 . . . .  [The 
CEC] also knew free agency would push veteran salaries up and force clubs to be more 
competitive.  That, of course, would mean less profit for . . . owners.” NFLPA in the 
1980s, supra note 126. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Still working without a contract, the Union elected to file suit with the NLRB. Id. 
 149 NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126. 
 150 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  The NFLPA also sued pursuant to sections 4 and 16 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26. See generally Powell I, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 
1988), rev’d, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 151 Powell I, 678 F. Supp. at 781. 
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system.152  Because this issue was a mandatory subject of 
bargaining, the nonstatutory labor exemption continued to protect 
Ownership’s activities until the parties reached a bargaining 
impasse.153  Thus, in order to protect the status quo and foster a 
“stable environment in which to negotiate a new collective 
bargaining agreement,”154 the nonstatutory labor exemption also 
survived the expiration of the CBA until an impasse.155  The 
district court stopped short of stating whether the parties had 
reached an impasse, as the NFL had filed a charge with the NLRB 
alleging that the Union had not bargained in good faith.156  The 
court pointed out, “[b]ecause a finding of good faith must be made 
as a precondition to determining impasse, the Court must await the 
NLRB’s ‘good faith’ determination.”157  The NLRB eventually 
issued a ruling that allowed the Players’ Association’s lawsuit to 
continue.158 
On appeal, the district court found that the nonstatutory labor 
exemption did apply because the parties had negotiated to an 
impasse.159  However, the district court refused to issue an 
injunction, opining that “a preliminary injunction to secure 
unrestricted free agency would wholly subvert the collective 
bargaining process160 and thereby offend a central purpose of the 
 
 152 Id.  The court opined that the free agency system provision of the 1982 CBA met the 
three necessary elements under the Mackey Test. Id. at 783–84. 
 153 Id. at 785. 
 154 Id. 
 155 This occurs following intense, good faith negotiations, where the parties have 
exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement, despite their best efforts. Id. at 788 
(citing the standard as provided in Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967), 
which states that an impasse exists after “good-faith negotiations have exhausted the 
prospects of concluding and agreement”). 
 156 Id. at 789. 
 157 Id. 
 158 On April 28, 1988, the NLRB rendered its ruling, dismissing the League’s charge of 
bad faith bargaining. Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Minn. 
1988) [hereinafter Powell II]; see also Goplerud, supra note 86, at 27. 
 159 See Powell II, 690 F. Supp. at 814. 
 160 The court went further into its rationale by saying:  
[i]t would be highly destructive to collective bargaining if major 
issues could be removed from the bargaining table and preliminarily 
resolved in isolation in antitrust litigation.  If one of the parties to the 
bargaining relationship were able to secure the substance of its 
bargaining objectives by obtaining a preliminary injunction, there 
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Norris-LaGuardia Act.”161  Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit held that the nonstatutory labor exemption 
protected the Owners beyond impasse, and that as a result, the 
Union could not bring an antitrust suit to enforce what should be 
enforced through good faith bargaining.162  In other words, the 
courts defer to federal labor law if the issue could be resolved 
through the bargaining process or be heard before the NLRB.  As 
the Union was forced back to the bargaining table, it took note of 
Justice Gerald Heaney’s dissent that subtly suggested a bold move: 
disband the union so the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer 
applies.163 
D. Decertification and Challenging “Plan B” Free Agency 
The Union took Justice Heaney’s counsel literally.  On 
November 3, 1989, two days after the Powell III decision, the 
Union formally disclaimed any interest in representing NFL 
players in collective bargaining.164  Player representatives 
convened in Dallas on December 5, 1989 and finalized this 
dramatic decision by ending the NFLPA’s official status as a 
union.165  Instead, the NFLPA now exists more as a trade 
association, lacking any authority to bargain on behalf of 
players.166 
 
would be very little motivation for that party to bargain in good faith 
toward reaching an agreement.  Judicial intervention at this stage of 
the bargaining process would give one side a preliminary victory 
while effectively disabling the other.   
Powell II, 690 F. Supp. at 817. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Powell III, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 163 Justice Heaney wrote:  
[t]he majority purports to reject the owners’ argument that the labor 
exemption in this case continues indefinitely.  The practical effect of 
the majority’s opinion, however, is just that—because the labor 
exemption will continue until the bargaining relationship is 
terminated either by a NLRB decertification proceeding or by 
abandonment of bargaining rights by the union.  
Id. at 1305 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
 164 NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Goplerud, supra note 86, at 29. 
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Between Powell I and Powell II, the League somewhat 
modified its free agency system and established a process called 
“Plan B Free Agency.”167  Under Plan B Free Agency, all NFL 
teams preserved limited rights over no more than thirty-seven 
players out of a forty-five man roster season.168  If a player was a 
protected free agent, the team signing that player was obligated to 
provide the previous club an opportunity to match the tendering-
team’s offer, or a right of first refusal.169  If the player’s former 
organization chose not to match the offer, the signing club had to 
provide compensation in the form of draft choices.170  Unprotected 
players could negotiate contracts with a team of their choosing.  
Plan B Free Agency allowed generally less talented players to, in 
many instances, secure larger contracts than more highly skilled 
players simply because protected players were precluded from 
negotiating with other teams without compensating their original 
club.171 
Plan B Free Agency all but halted the mobility of marquee 
players.  Union leaders filed a class action lawsuit against the 
League in response to this Rozelle Rule-like scheme.172  Because 
the Union had disbanded, labor law no longer governed the parties’ 
relationship.  The lawsuit challenged the League’s free agency 
rules as an unlawful restraint of trade in court without contravening 
labor law.173  The Players ultimately prevailed as a jury found in 
their favor.174  The jury found that Plan B Free Agency deprived 
players of the opportunity to freely offer their services as 
professional football players to other teams, causing them to 
 
 167 See Ari Nissim, The Trading Game: NFL Free Agency, the Salary Cap, and a 
Proposal for Greater Trading Flexibility, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 257, 260 (2004). 
 168 Id. 
 169 See Reynolds v. Nat’l Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 170 Thomas George, N.F.L.’s Free-Agency System Is Found Unfair by U.S. Jury, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at A1. 
 171 Nissim, supra note 167, at 260. 
 172 New York Jets running back Freeman McNeil was chosen as the lead plaintiff for 
free agency because of his first name, Freeman (the symbolic nature of the name, as 
“Free Man”). See generally McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 
1992).  
 173 See McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 10, 1992). 
 174 See generally id.  
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receive less compensation.175  The jury felt that these rules were 
more restrictive than reasonably necessary to achieve the objective 
of establishing or maintaining competitive balance within the 
NFL.176  Through the McNeil decision and additional ensuing 
litigation, the Union ended Plan B Free Agency177 and continued to 
apply pressure on the Owners. 
E. The Modern Era—a Time of Mutual Economic Gain and 
Benefit 
With the League now susceptible to attack through antitrust 
law, Ownership began settlement talks with the Players’ 
Association in November 1992.178  During that time, Union leaders 
had filed another lawsuit, White v. National Football League, 
which sought true free agency and compensation relief through the 
legal system.179  Ownership desired enactment of a mechanism to 
curb unbridled free agency and protect smaller-market teams in the 
form of a salary cap.180  Players sought true free agency.  The 
parties finally reached an agreement outside of court in January 
1993, and submitted it to Judge David S. Doty of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Minnesota for a consent decree.  The 
settlement agreement submitted to Judge Doty contained a 
provision that Judge Doty’s court would retain jurisdiction over the 
enforcement and review of the agreement as well as all other 
matters stemming from the eventual CBA.181  The stipulated 
 
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. 
 177 See generally Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992); 
see also White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993) (class action 
by Eagles defensive end Reggie White on behalf of all players). 
 178 Although it became increasingly evident that collective bargaining was going to 
settle this dispute, Ownership still attempted to break Union solidarity.  For instance, 
Owners tried to steal players from the Union’s licensing arm over to the NFL’s licensing 
arm by giving certain players more money. NFLPA in the 1980s, supra note 126 (noting 
that Jim Kelly, Dan Marino, Bubby Brister, Warren Moon, Phil Simms, John Elway, 
Boomer Esiason, Troy Aikman, Jim Everett, and Randall Cunningham all defected to 
NFL Properties). 
 179 See generally White, 822 F. Supp. at 1389. 
 180 The 1990’s—Growth of the Union, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nfl 
players.com/about-us/History (last visited Dec. 30, 2009) [hereinafter NFLPA in the 
1990s]. 
 181 See White v. Nat’l Football League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir. 2009). 
C08_LEVINE-MARAVENT_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2010  1:03 PM 
1446 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1419 
settlement agreement was signed on April 30, 1993 and contained 
all of the major provisions sought by both sides.  Settlement finally 
came through compromise.  Once the CBA was approved and the 
consent decree was in place to settle the White antitrust lawsuit, the 
NFL voluntarily recognized the NFLPA as the Players’ 
Association’s bargaining representative.182  Finally there was labor 
peace between the NFL and the NFLPA. 
Over the years, the NFLPA and the League extended their 
1993 agreement five times.  The most recent extension took place 
in March 2006 when both sides voted to extend the CBA through 
the 2011 season.  Ownership voted thirty-to-two to accept the 
NFLPA’s final proposal.  Each vote to extend the collective 
bargaining agreement was also a vote against uncertainty and to 
maintain the status quo.  However, on May 20, 2008, in the midst 
of the worst recession in decades, League owners unanimously 
voted to opt out of the agreement.183 
Under the CBA, the 2010 season operates as the agreement’s 
final year if one of the parties opts out.184  Further, the 2010 season 
will operate without a salary cap.185  While this may be perceived 
as being beneficial to NFL players, there are drawbacks.  For 
instance, there is no salary floor, meaning that Ownership can 
spend as little as it desires on player salaries.186  Other negatives 
include the extension of free agency eligibility from four years to 
six years of service, franchises’ ability to use an additional 
franchise tag, and restrictions on a playoff team’s ability to sign 
free agents.187  Thus the players will also be penalized in the 
uncapped year. 
 
 182 This occurred after a majority of players signed authorization cards and the 
American Arbitration Association acknowledged the NFLPA. See White, 822 F. Supp. at 
1435.  The NFLPA membership vote to ratify the new CBA was 952 for, and 34 against. 
NFLPA in the 1990s, supra note 180. 
 183 NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id= 
09000d5d80868b78&template=without-video&confirm=true (last visited Dec. 30, 2009). 
 184 NFL-CBA Related Questions and Answers, SI.COM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/ 
2010/football/nfl/01/20/cba.qa/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id.  
 187 Tom Curran, Goodell on Work Stoppage, NBCSPORTS.COM, Mar. 23, 2009, 
http://blogs.nbcsports.com/home/archives/2009/03/goodell-on-work-stoppage.html; see 
also Maske, NFL Appears, supra note 50. 
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In its view, Ownership opted out early because it was an 
unreasonable fiscal obligation to spend more than half of NFL 
combined revenue on player expenses without getting some 
concession or cooperation from the Union in return.  In particular, 
the League was referring to costs associated with the massive 
stadium initiative undertaken in the late 1990s under 
Commissioner Tagliabue’s leadership.  The League released a 
statement addressing its reasons for opting out, attributing its 
decision to the high cost of player salaries and having to spend 
significant money on stadium construction, operations, and 
improvements.188  According to the NFL’s statement, these facts 
along with the recession prevent Owners from wanting to invest in 
the game under the current CBA.189 
Ownership has taken issue with other material elements of the 
current deal.  For example, the CBA effectively prohibits clubs 
from recouping bonuses paid to players who, after signing, breach 
their player contracts or refuse to perform.190  This issue was 
exemplified by the events surrounding the incarceration of former 
Atlanta Falcons’ quarterback and convicted dog fighting ring 
financier Michael Vick.  Vick was able to keep most of his twenty 
million dollar signing bonus even though he was in prison and 
unable to play.191  The League now seeks to bargain over the 
handling of this type of issue. 
Owners are also dissatisfied with the rising salaries of rookie 
players.  Some first year players make more money than veterans 
who have already proven their worth.  In 2006, Ownership failed 
to allocate ample time to examine how to curb rookie salaries 
during those negotiations.  Now the NFL wishes to negotiate better 
 
 188 Jason Cole, Owners Opt Out, YAHOO SPORTS (May 20, 2008), http://sports. 
yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=jc-optout052008&prov=yhoo&type=lgns. 
 189 Id. 
 190 See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, art. XIV, § 9 (2006). 
 191 See White v. Nat’l Football League, No. 4-92-906(DSD), 2008 WL 1827423, at *1 
(D. Minn. Apr. 22, 2008); see also Judge: Vick Can Keep $20M Signing Bonus, 
CBS.COM, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/04/sports/main3785 
994.shtml?source= RSSattr=U.S._3785994. 
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terms for its member clubs and allocate more resources for players 
who prove themselves.192 
Although Mr. Upshaw strongly opposed a rookie salary 
scale,193 many members of his constituency were in favor of a 
rookie pay scale.194  It was in the best interests of many players to 
have CBA mechanisms that curtail large rookie bonuses and other 
forms of guaranteed compensation in order to free up salary cap 
space for veteran contracts.195  Sadly, the NFLPA’s hard-line 
stance against a rookie salary scale changed, as Mr. Upshaw 
passed away on August 21, 2008196 after losing a short bout with 
pancreatic cancer.197  The successor to the iconic former all-pro 
and union leader would take a different viewpoint on many NFL-
Union issues, including rookie wage scales. 
After a lengthy, and at times controversial,198 search for a new 
executive director, the Union settled on pro football outsider 
DeMaurice Smith.  Each of the Union’s thirty-two player 
representatives voted in favor of Smith, a lawyer with no 
professional football ties and no labor law experience.199  Smith is 
 
 192 See Dan Wetzel, Rookie Salaries Out of This League, YAHOO SPORTS (Apr. 25, 
2008), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=dw-draftsalaries042408. 
 193 See Gene Upshaw, 100 Words from Gene Upshaw for April 28, NFLPA.COM (Apr. 
28, 2008), http://www.nflplayers.com/Articles/NFLPAs-Weekly-Message/100-Words-
From-Gene-Upshaw-for-April-28. 
 194 See Michael David Smith, Tomlinson Favors Rookie Cap, PRO FOOTBALL TALK 
(June 20, 2008), http://www.profootballtalk.com/2008/06/20/tomlinson-favors-rookie-
cap; see also Mike Florio, Mawae Doesn’t Like Rookie Windfalls, PRO FOOTBALL TALK 
(May 21, 2008), http://www.profootballtalk.com/2008/05/21/mawae-doesnt-like-rookie-
windfalls. 
 195 Deubert & Wong, supra note 43, at 228. 
 196 A potential byproduct of Upshaw’s tragic death may be the erosion of any rapport 
the Union may have possessed with Goodell and other members of the Management 
Council. 
 197 Hall of Famer Upshaw Loses Battle with Pancreatic Cancer, ESPN.COM, Aug. 21, 
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3545830. 
 198 See Mike Florio, Lawsuit Claims that Troy Vincent Was Undermining Upshaw, PRO 
FOOTBALL TALK (Sept. 1, 2009), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/09/01/lawsuit 
-claims-that-troy-vincent-was-undermining-gene-upshaw; see also NFLPA: Feds 
Investigating Alleged Collusion Between Goodell, Vincent, USA TODAY, Sept. 2, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2009-09-01-nflpa-investigation_N.htm. 
 199 Mark Maske, DeMaurice Smith Elected New Union Leader, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 
2009, http://views.washingtonpost.com/theleague/nflnewsfeed/2009/03/demaurice-smith-
elected-new-union-leader.html; see also Attorney Smith Elected to Succeed Upshaw as 
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a former partner at the Washington, D.C.-based firm of Patton 
Boggs and is a former United States attorney with connections to 
many key government figures, including current Attorney General 
Eric Holder and President Obama.200  Smith pledged that he would 
use his substantial political connections to assist the players during 
negotiations.201  While Smith’s rhetoric initially took a conciliatory 
tone when referring to the lockout with the NFL, his language is 
now escalating and becoming pessimistic.202 
Formal negotiations between the parties began in summer 2009 
but the verbal jousting began long before these discussions.  While 
each side publicly approached these talks with the expectation that 
they would be productive, the opposite seems to be occurring.  
Smith notified his constituency that the NFL intends to lock out the 
players in 2011 and, although both sides continue to negotiate, 
players should begin to save at least one-fourth of their earnings 
during the next two years.203  The Union is further preparing for a 
labor stoppage by creating a strike/lockout fund.204  This fund will 
be established through a 50% increase in union dues for the 2009 
and 2010 seasons.205  Another trend beginning to emerge in the 
 
NFLPA Executive Director, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 27, 2009, available at 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80f469df&template=withoutvideo&confirm
=true [hereinafter Attorney Smith Elected]. 
 200 Jeff Levine, After Bargaining Session, NFL Players Association Takes Message to 
Washington, BIZ OF FOOTBALL (July 21, 2009), http://www.bizoffootball.com/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=469:after-bargaining-session-nfl-players-
association-takes-message-to-washington&catid=44:articles-and-opinion&Itemid=61. 
 201 See Michael David Smith, DeMaurice Smith: ‘If It’s Going to Be a Fight, Lets Get It 
Going,’ NFL FANHOUSE (May 16, 2009), http://nfl.fanhouse.com/2009/05/16/demaurice-
smith-if-its-going-to-be-a-fight-lets-get-it-goin. 
 202 See Jim Corbett, Smith: NFLPA Hopes for ‘Peace,’ Prepares for ‘War’ with 
Owners, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/ 
2009-03-16-nflpa-update_N.htm. 
 203 Scott Brown & Carl Prine, Union Chief: NFL Headed for Lockout, PITTSBURGH 
TRIB.-REV., Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.pittsburghlive.com:8000/x/pittsburghtrib/sports/ 
s_638933.html. 
 204 NFLPA Votes to Start Fund for ’11 in Case of Lockout or Strike, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/ 
133277. 
 205 Liz Mullen of the SportsBusiness Journal reported that the NFLPA, on September 
21, 2009,  
sent out a notice to agents that active NFL player dues for the ’09 and 
’10 seasons are being increased from $10,000 to $15,000 per player 
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early stage of bargaining is the League’s summary rejection of any 
and all NFLPA proposals,206 a tactic that is eerily familiar to the 
beginning stages of the NHL lockout.207  The Union believes that 
this familiar tactic is the work of League outside counsel Bob 
Batterman and, like the NHL labor stoppage, Owners will wait to 
engage in substantive negotiations until the current CBA has 
expired.208 
The NHL and NFL conflicts also share a common element in 
that the NFL and NHL labor stoppages involve attempts by both 
labor and management to gain leverage through use of the media.  
Although each denies their interest in utilizing the media to 
communicate their respective message, both Goodell and Smith are 
using such methods to transmit increasingly contentious 
messages209 to each other and the public.  Both sides understand 
the importance of controlling and manipulating the media, as 
public support hinges on the information disseminated through 
various media outlets.  As detailed in Part III, the most recent 
 
in order to create a “dues lockout fund.”  NFL player agents’ annual 
membership fees have not been affected, sources said.  For players, in 
addition to the flat annual $15,000 dues, those who are eligible to 
receive the equal share licensing royalty payments due them by NFL 
Players, Inc will have their dues increased by that amount as well for 
’09 and ’10.  In past years that payment equaled approximately 
$10,000 per player—which means dues for those players will equal 
about $25,000.  
NFLPA Increasing Yearly Players Dues to Establish Lockout Fund, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/ 
133481. 
 206 See, e.g., Judy Battista, Players’ Bid to Keep Salary Cap Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 2, 2010, at B16; NFLPA Says Proposed One-Year Extension of CBA Rejected by 
League, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.sports 
businessdaily.com/article/137461. 
 207 See Jeff Levine, Labor Web Site for NFL Mirrors NHL’s Past Effort, BIZ OF 
FOOTBALL (Feb. 13, 2010), http://www.bizoffootball.com/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=631:labor-web-site-for-nfl-mirrors-nhls-past-effort&catid=34: 
nfl-news&Itemid=53. 
 208 See Liz Mullen, NFL Rejects Players’ ‘Lock-in’ Idea for Future Labor Talks, 
SPORTING NEWS TODAY, Nov. 3, 2009, at 21 [hereinafter Mullen, NFL Rejects Players’], 
available at http://today.sportingnews.com/sportingnewstoday/20091103/?pg=21&pm= 
1&u1=friend#pg21. 
 209 Smith Waiting for Formal CBA Proposal, ESPN.COM, Sept. 9, 2009, http://sports. 
espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4457637. 
C08_LEVINE-MARAVENT_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2010  1:03 PM 
2010] SPORTS LAW FORUM: FUMBLING AWAY THE SEASON 1451 
lockout in professional sports illustrates that either side can win a 
labor stoppage by influencing the public’s view on the matter.  
Understanding this concept may provide some clues as to how both 
the NFL and the Union will proceed if there indeed is a lockout in 
2011. 
III. RECOUNTING THE NHL LOCKOUT 
A. From Enjoying Unrivaled Success to Facing-Off Against Dire 
Financial Straits 
The NHL faced a financial crisis earlier this decade that is 
similar to the dilemma confronting the NFL.  Professional hockey 
enjoyed a period of tremendous growth in the late 1990s, both 
economically and in fan viewership.  However, the NHL seemed to 
be in dire straits in the early portion of the new millennium.  The 
majority of NHL franchises claimed an operating loss.210  Several 
franchises reported losses of at least $30 million and four teams 
had recently filed for bankruptcy protection.211  NHL 
Commissioner Gary Bettman asserted that player salaries were the 
chief reason for each team’s financial losses and that a salary cap 
was the only solution.212  The NHL lobbied NHLPA Executive 
Director Bob Goodenow213 to consider a salary cap for the good of 
 
 210 Nineteen out of the NHL’s thirty teams claimed an operating loss. See Stephen M. 
Yoost, The National Hockey League and Salary Arbitration: Time for a Line Change, 21 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 485, 491–92 (2006). 
 211 Id. 
 212 See Alan Adams, NHL and Union Reject New Proposals, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 
2004, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/2004-12-14-labor-talks_x.htm (“We 
only know of really one approach to meaningfully address and fix our problems.  And 
that means we need to forge an economic partnership [implement a salary cap] . . . .  We 
need to be together—teams and players, league and union—working together to grow 
this game and I don’t think there’s any substitute for that.” (quoting Bettman) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 213 Mr. Goodenow played college hockey at Harvard and after completing his brief 
NHL playing career, received his J.D. from the University of Detroit Law School.  Mr. 
Goodenow assumed leadership of the NHLPA in 1992. 
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the game; however, it also started accumulating a war chest in case 
of a work stoppage.214 
After the 2002–03 NHL season, the NHL began using the 
media to publicly justify locking out players.  Commissioner 
Bettman asserted that NHL player salaries were disproportionately 
larger when compared to other major sports.215  He illustrated this 
point by saying that the NHL would “lose less money by not 
playing” hockey next season.216  To validate Bettman’s assertion, 
the League retained former SEC Chairperson Arthur Levitt to 
prepare a finances audit of NHL revenues and losses.217  The audit 
showed that NHL teams collectively lost $273 million during the 
2002–03 season;218 it further unveiled that “an astounding 73% of 
NHL revenue was paid to players in the 2002–2003 season, 
significantly [more]” when compared with the other major sports 
in America.219  The NHLPA attacked the accuracy of the report, 
calling it “flawed”220 and asserting that the report was “‘simply 
another league public relations initiative [to blame the players for 
hockey’s financial situation].’”221  This report and the resulting 
exchange between the two sides helped sow seeds of distrust that 
eventually led to the longest labor dispute in professional sports. 
 
 214 The NHL mandated that each club contribute $10 million into a “rainy day” fund, 
which would most likely be used to cover financial loses as a result of the looming labor 
stoppage. Abrams, supra note 16, at 61–62.  
 215 Bettman, prior to the lockout, continuously cited the report stating “players get 76 
percent of all league revenues—far more than the percentage for the other major team 
sports.” Associated Press, ‘We Can’t Live Any Longer’ Under This CBA, ESPN.COM, 
May 26, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=1809397.  
 216 Commish Claims Locked-Out Union in Denial, ESPN.COM, Nov. 2, 2004, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=1914328. 
 217 Liebman, supra note 16, at 91–92. 
 218 Yoost, supra note 210, at 491. 
 219 Jonathan Kotler, Parallel Unionism in Professional Hockey: Redefining the 
Nonstatutory Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 843, 847 (2007). 
 220 Associated Press, NHL Lockout Chronology, ESPN.COM, Feb. 16, 2005, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1993004&type=story; see also Liebman, supra 
note 16, at 92 (“Forbes Magazine conducted a study of league revenues and expenditures 
during the 2002–2003 season.  Forbes reported that teams lost $123 million and that the 
league spent only 66% of its revenues on player salaries.”). 
 221 See NHLPA’s Goodenow Issues Response, TSN.COM, Feb. 12, 2004, 
http://www.tsn.ca/nhl/story/?id=71954. 
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B. 2004 Lockout 
The NHL remained resolute in its necessity of achieving cost 
certainty.  “We can’t live any longer under [this] CBA,” 
Commissioner Bettman maintained.222  Both sides knew the danger 
a labor stoppage posed; a prior lockout in 1994 had reversed years 
of fan development in North America.  Television ratings had 
suffered as a result of the lost games.223  Despite the substantial 
risks associated with any labor stoppage, Bettman realized that 
curtailing player costs was paramount to the League’s financial 
viability.  This meant securing a salary cap regardless of the 
consequences.224 
Bettman was determined to learn from the mistakes the league 
had made during prior labor stoppages.225  Ownership would stay 
disciplined and not make any concessions until players accepted a 
salary cap.  The NHL’s strategy seemed to include a component of 
using the press to convince the public that a salary cap was 
necessary to save the game.  This message put the NHLPA in a 
difficult public relations position, as it had already backed itself 
into a corner by refusing to accept any proposal with a salary cap.  
Goodenow’s steadfast refusal to even consider this cost control 
provision allowed the media to cast blame on the players for not 
making financial concessions necessary to save the game. 
Sensing that the upcoming labor conflict would be long in 
duration, Goodenow attempted to prepare his side for a prolonged 
lockout.  However, he was unsure whether players were willing to 
sacrifice one or two seasons of guaranteed salary in order to avoid 
a cap.226  NHL owners considered using replacement players as the 
lockout began in earnest.  In response, Goodenow reportedly 
mandated that any player who chose to cross party lines would be 
 
 222 Attorney Smith Elected, supra note 199.  
 223 See Jake Fisher, Television and the Potential NFL Lockout, HARV. SPORTS ANALYSIS 
COLLECTIVE, Nov. 18, 2009, http://harvardsportsanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/ 
television-and-the-potential-nfl-lockout. 
 224 Id. 
 225 In prior labor conflicts, NHL owners had lacked cohesion and conceded to player 
demands.  For example, NHL owners locked players out in 1995 in order to secure a 
salary cap.  However, owners were unable to maintain a united front and ended up 
signing a new CBA that lacked a salary cap.  
 226 Avoiding a cap would benefit future NHL players. 
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obligated to pay back to the NHLPA all player benefits received 
during the work stoppage.227  This amount totaled between $5,000 
and $10,000 per each month of the labor stoppage.228  The NHL 
responded to this edict by filing an unfair labor practice (“ULP”) 
against the Players Association,229 calling such a practice 
“coercive.”230  This ULP filing quashed any hope that both sides 
would quickly find common ground and work to save the season. 
On February 16, 2005, the NHL canceled the season.  As the 
lockout trudged on, players were the first side to exhibit signs of 
breaking solidarity.231  Players were not willing to sacrifice a 
significant portion of their career to fight a cap through a 
prolonged labor dispute.232  Some players were reportedly 
communicating with general managers, owners, and the media.233  
This activity undermined Goodenow’s position.  The owners, in 
contrast and unlike during prior labor stoppages, did not break 
rank234 and presented a united front.  It soon became evident to 
Goodenow that his union was neither united nor willing to sacrifice 
several seasons in order to avoid a salary cap.235  Bettman’s new 
NHL would involve a salary cap.  Some leaders within the NHLPA 
 
 227 League Dislikes NHLPA’s Replacement Player Stance, ESPN.COM, Mar. 27, 2005, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2022161. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id.  Any player who crossed the picket line was at risk of violating § 8(b)(1) of the 
NLRB. See generally Overview of the National Labor Relations Act, NLRB, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/overview/national_labor_relations_act.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2010). 
 230 Associated Press, NHL Files an Unfair Labor Practice Charge with NLRB, WASH. 
POST, at D03.  “The practice of conditioning the receipt of work stoppage benefits on a 
player’s agreement not to return to the NHL without a new CBA was coercive, and in 
violation of the player’s rights under the labor laws,” NHL Chief Legal Officer Bill Daly 
said. Id. 
 231 Because players were beginning to crack just months into the lockout, it seemed 
unreasonable to believe that they would last through 2006. Sheila Bloch & Lee Clark, 
Report to the NHLPA Executive Board and Members 40 (2007) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors).  
 232 Players were not prepared for a prolonged strike or to sacrifice the only asset they 
had: their career. Id. 
 233 Id. at 39. 
 234 Id. at 41 (discussing how the critical part of the lockout was won by ownership due 
to Bettman policing management and maintaining a united front against the players). 
 235 Id. at 46 (discussing the players’ trepidation concerning a prolonged work stoppage 
in hockey). 
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realized the union needed to change its strategy since its 
membership was capitulating to a salary cap.236  Disagreement 
over the appropriate new strategy created a rift among the union’s 
leadership. 
As more serious negotiations began, the NHLPA split into 
several factions: those who supported a salary cap (this strategy 
was led by Goodenow’s number two and NHLPA general counsel, 
Ted Saskin) and those still loyal to Goodenow, who would not vote 
for a cap.237  Whether it was a purposeful strategy by the NHL or 
just a fortunate occurrence, a wedge began to form between 
Goodenow and other senior union members.238  Goodenow’s 
control on the CBA negotiation process began to weaken.239  
Saskin started to emerge as the more effective NHLPA negotiator.  
The NHL attempted to eliminate Goodenow from the negotiation 
process entirely by suggesting to Saskin that he “keep the lines of 
communication open” with Bettman’s number two, Bill Daly.240  
Increasingly, both Saskin and Daly assumed the roles as 
negotiators of the new CBA.  This isolation of Goodenow, in 
effect, allowed Saskin to legitimize himself as the de facto union 
leader.241 
Negotiations began progressing more smoothly once 
Goodenow became less of a factor.  Saskin agreed to a salary cap 
and tension in the bargaining process began to ease.  Eventually, 
the sides agreed to a new CBA in principle.242  One byproduct of 
the cap-inclusive CBA was the resignation of Goodenow.  The 
aftermath of the lockout left the NHLPA in an extremely weakened 
state.  Since the conclusion of the lockout, the union has gone 
through at least two different executive directors243 and is currently 
 
 236 Id. (stating that the Union’s mantra of “no cap” was no longer an option). 
 237 Id. at 49. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Key Terms of NHL Agreement, ESPN.COM, July 13, 2005, http://sports.espn.go. 
com/nhl/columns/story?id=2107128. 
 242 Sides Will Have to Ratify New CBA, ESPN.COM, July 13, 2005, http://sports. 
espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2106776. 
 243 See Maury Brown, Ian Penny Steps Down as Interim Exec. Director of NHLPA, BIZ 
OF HOCKEY (Oct. 31, 2009), http://www.bizofhockey.com (search “Ian Penny Steps 
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without an executive director, general counsel, or outside legal 
counsel.  Now, the National Football League has Bob Batterman 
serving as outside counsel.  Mr. Batterman may provide the NFL a 
blueprint similar to the one utilized by the NHL during its recent 
lockout. 
IV. THE PERTINENT LAWS, POSITIONS, AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE 
PARTIES 
A. Statement of the Case 
NFL ownership gravitated toward labor uncertainty in 2008 
when it elected to opt out of the CBA extension signed only two 
years prior.  The single biggest issue in need of renegotiation is the 
League’s rising labor costs.  Initially, the Union’s leadership 
responded to this event by quipping that Ownership “just [doesn’t] 
like what [it] agreed to in March of 2006” and that if Ownership 
locked out the players, the Union would decertify, thereby 
disabling labor law and enabling the Union to sue the NFL under 
antitrust law.244  However, as time has passed and leadership has 
changed within the Players’ Association, a quick defusing of this 
potential lockout seems like wishful thinking.  Both sides have 
done little bargaining and have instead opted to pad their 
respective war chests and prepare for a protracted, and potentially 
contentious, negotiation process. 
 
Down,” result will be fourth from top); see also Liz Mullen, Paul Kelly Fired as 
Executive Director of NHLPA, SPORTING NEWS TODAY, Aug. 31, 2009, 
http://www.sportingnews.com/nhl/article/2009-08-31/report-paul-kelly-fired-executive-
director-nhlpa; NHLPA Fires Executive Director Ted Saskin, CBC.COM, May 10, 2007, 
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/story/2007/05/10/nhlpa-saskin-fired.html.  
 244 Lester Munson, Storm Clouds Gather and Lockout Looms Large in NFL Labor 
Strife, ESPN.COM, Mar. 12, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?id= 
3288568. 
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B. Applicable Law 
1. The National Labor Relations Act and Refusals to Bargain 
Collectively 
The National Labor Relations Act245 (the “NLRA” or the 
“Act”) is the guidepost by which all collective bargaining exists.  
Central to the Act is the duty to bargain collectively in good faith, 
as this process is intended to be a tool to foster industrial peace: 
For the purposes of this section, to bargain 
collectively is the performance of the mutual 
obligation of the employer and the representative of 
the employees to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement . . . and the 
execution of a written contract incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party, but 
such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession . . . .246 
Section 158(a)(5) of the Act states that an employer’s refusal to 
bargain collectively with its employee representatives is grounds 
for an unfair labor practice247 and that a labor organization or its 
agent’s refusal to bargain collectively with the employer is also 
grounds for a ULP.248  The statutory language only states that there 
is a duty to bargain in good faith; the NLRB and the federal courts 
have rendered opinions establishing what is and what is not 
bargaining in good faith.  Section 8(5) of The Wagner Act of 
1935249 established an employer’s “refus[al] to bargain collectively 
with the representatives of his employees” as an unfair labor 
 
 245 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
 246 Id. § 158(d). 
 247 This is subject to § 159(a), which involves the construction industry and is outside 
the scope of this Comment. 
 248 Id. § 158(b)(3). 
 249 This is the original version of the National Labor Relations Act. National Labor 
Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69).  
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practice.250  In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Amendments added the 
requirement that unions must collectively bargain.251  As defined 
by the Supreme Court, the purpose of the Act is to provide a 
vehicle for the “free opportunity for negotiation with accredited 
representatives of employees . . . [and] to promote industrial 
peace.”252 
2. The Bargaining Obligation 
Primarily, the Act calls on the parties “to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment.”253  There is no 
mandate that the parties reach an actual agreement; however, there 
is a requirement that both sides attempt to find an amicable 
resolution.254  The requirements of the parties can be broken down 
as follows: the duty to meet, confer, and negotiate, and the 
obligation to deal in good faith. 
a) The Duty to Meet, Confer, and Negotiate 
Nowhere in the Act does it state how many times or how often 
the parties must meet in order to satisfy its good faith duty.255  The 
requirement to meet at reasonable times was discussed in NLRB v. 
Highland Park Manufacturing Co.,256 where the union was 
negotiating a draft proposal of an agreement with management.257  
After the second negotiating session was cut short due to the 
company president’s illness, the vice president took over.  He met 
with the union twice more and then stopped negotiating.258  The 
Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board that the company’s response 
to the union when taken collectively amounted to a refusal to 
 
 250 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). 
 251 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 
Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–44); see also JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., 
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT 824 (BNA Books 2006) (1970). 
 252 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45–47 (1937). 
 253 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 254 See generally HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 825. 
 255 Id. 
 256 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940).  
 257 Id. at 634. 
 258 Id. 
C08_LEVINE-MARAVENT_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2010  1:03 PM 
2010] SPORTS LAW FORUM: FUMBLING AWAY THE SEASON 1459 
bargain because the employer had no intent of reaching an 
agreement with the union.259  The court elaborated that the 
endgame in collective bargaining is not necessarily an agreement, 
but the desire to forge an accord. 
The court opined the mere act of meeting with no intention of 
ever agreeing to an accord is evidence of a lack of good faith.260  
“If some valid reason had been advanced for unwillingness to 
reduce agreements to writing, this conclusion would not 
necessarily follow; but in the absence of explanation, it clearly 
indicates respondent’s hostility to the whole process of collective 
bargaining.”261  The court likened the coming to terms of an 
agreement to “an industrial constitution of the enterprise;” if a 
party is not interested in coming to an agreement, then there is no 
interest in industrial harmony.262 
b) The Obligation to Deal in Good Faith 
Like the duty to confer, meet, and negotiate, the obligation to 
deal in good faith is not precisely defined.  The United States 
Supreme Court adopted this concept in 1940 when it decided 
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB,263 a case where the employer 
refused to acknowledge the union as the designated bargaining 
representative.264  The employer’s president “declined to recognize 
the [u]nion as the bargaining representative of all the employees, 
and declared that he would negotiate with it only as the bargaining 
representative of the Union members, refusing to bargain with it as 
the representative of all the employees, a plain violation of the 
Act.”265  The company president then refused to negotiate with the 
union altogether.266  The Court concluded that the negotiations the 
employer entered into “were not entered into by the [employer] in 
 
 259 Id. at 637. 
 260 Id. at 637–38. 
 261 Id. at 638. 
 262 Id. 
 263 309 U.S. 350 (1940). 
 264 The employer also attempted to circulate a petition amongst the employees to have 
an employer-dominated committee negotiate the CBA.  Some employees signed and then 
subsequently cancelled their signatures. See id. at 358. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id.  
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good faith, and were but thinly disguised refusals to treat with the 
Union representatives.”267 
The determinative issue was whether the employer had actually 
intended to negotiate with the union.  More recent examples of an 
employer’s refusal to bargain in good faith are abundant.268  The 
decisions all demonstrate the Act’s desire to have the parties 
negotiate with the vision of reaching an agreement.  An employer’s 
conduct is generally evaluated under the totality of the particular 
circumstances.269  Any alleged bad faith conduct in question may 
take place at or away from the bargaining table.270 
3. Subjects of Bargaining 
The Act classifies the failure of the parties to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith as to “wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment” as an unfair labor 
practice.271  These three areas are considered “mandatory subjects 
of bargaining,” and are subjects that the parties must negotiate in 
good faith in an attempt to reach an agreement.272  While the Act 
only classifies three items as mandatory subjects, the list of actual 
negotiation terms is much more expansive. 
In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,273 an 
employer insisted on a “ballot clause,” which called for a secret 
ballot election for employees as to the employer’s last pre-strike 
offer, and a “recognition clause” excluding the international union 
as the official bargaining representative of the union.274  At issue 
was whether this conduct amounted to a refusal to bargain over 
non-mandatory terms.275  The employer felt it had complied with 
its duties insofar as coming to terms on the three mandatory 
subjects, but its insistence on non-mandatory terms in the 
 
 267 Id. 
 268 See, e.g., Radisson Plaza Minneapolis v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1376, 1378–79 (8th Cir. 
1993); Excel Fire Prot. Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 241 (1992). 
 269 See Radisson Plaza, 987 F.2d at 1381.  
 270 Id. 
 271 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
 272 Id. 
 273 356 U.S. 342 (1958).  
 274 Id. at 343. 
 275 Id. at 344.  
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agreement was the basis of the alleged unfair labor practice.276  
The Court’s analysis of the Act as well as the employer’s conduct 
supported the Board’s sustained ULP charge.277  The Borg-Warner 
decision thus created the distinction between mandatory and 
permissive subjects of bargaining. 
Mandatory subjects of bargaining directly impact wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment. 278  These topics 
must be bargained for by the parties.279  Permissive bargaining 
subjects may be negotiated but such agreements are not 
mandatory.280  These subjects may include retiree benefits, internal 
union matters (such as how union representatives are elected, the 
amount of union dues, union officer structure, etc.), supervisors’ 
conditions of employment, interest arbitration, legal liability 
clauses, and the make-up of the employer’s board of trustees or 
directors.281  A unilateral change of a mandatory subject of 
bargaining falls into a certain category of violations.  By virtue of 
this conduct, this type of action is considered a per se violation of 
the Act.282 
4. Per Se Violations 
In NLRB v. Katz,283 the Court held that an employer’s unilateral 
change in granting merit increases, sick leave policy, and wage 
increases during its contract negotiations with the union (and prior 
to reaching an impasse) evidenced a per se violation of its 
 
 276 Id. at 348–49. 
 277 Id. at 349–50. 
 278 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
 279 Some examples of mandatory subjects in the NFL-NFLPA bargaining context 
include salary, holiday pay, bonus pay, step pay (including pay for rookies), vacations, 
discipline, union dues check off, grievance procedures (injury and non-injury), uniforms, 
and drug testing. 
 280 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 831. 
 281 There are also “illegal subjects of bargaining,” which include discrimination against 
certain groups of people, hot cargo clauses (allowing workers to refuse to handle 
materials/goods from a struck facility or on an “unfair” list), and closed shop clauses (a 
provision that all employees are union members before being hired). 
 282 See, e.g., Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991) (reaffirming 
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), and holding that it is an unfair labor practice to 
unilaterally implement a change to a mandatory subject of bargaining after contract 
termination without first bargaining to impasse). 
 283 369 U.S. 736 (1962).  
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requirement to bargain in good faith.284  Even if the employer 
exhibited “subjective good faith” in reaching an agreement, a 
unilateral change is nonetheless evidence of a violation because it 
circumvents the duty to negotiate.285  This circumvention frustrates 
the objectives of § 8(a)(5) and is tantamount to a flat refusal to 
bargain.286   
5. Good Faith 
In 1947, the “good faith” requirement was incorporated into 
section 8(d) of the NLRA.287  This good faith requirement means 
employers and employee organizations must meet and confer with 
an open mind and with the intent of reaching an agreement.288  
While there is no single definition of good faith in the context of 
labor relations, ascertaining whether an individual bargained in 
good faith centrally involves evaluating a party’s subjective state 
of mind and asking whether there exists an inclination to engage in 
sincere negotiations with an intent to settle differences and arrive 
at an agreement.289 
The NLRB and courts examine the facts of each case when 
dealing with a ULP charge.  In NLRB v. General Electric Co.,290 
the court upheld the Board’s decision that General Electric’s “take 
it or leave it” attitude during negotiations, its dealings with 
individual locals instead of the international union, as well as a 
media blitz against the union, constituted an unfair labor practice, 
despite the fact that the union signed a contract.291  In addition, 
General Electric only furnished part of the information requested 
after the end of the strike.292  General Electric also switched its 
position several times as to union offers, which stifled the pace of 
 
 284 Id. at 741–42.  
 285 Id. at 743. 
 286 See id. 
 287 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
 288 See HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 856. 
 289 See NLRB v. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F.2d 18, 22 (9th Cir. 1938). 
 290 418 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1969). 
 291 See id. at 746–56.  This tactic is also known as “Boulwareism.” See Marc 
Mandelman & Kevin Manara, Staying Above the Surface—Surface Bargaining Claims 
Under The National Labor Relations Act, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 261, 270 (2007). 
 292 Gen. Elec., 418 F.2d at 753. 
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negotiations.293  The court reasoned that the employer’s refusal to 
provide information within a timely manner forced the union into a 
position where it was “unable to bargain intelligently.”294  As to 
the charge that the employer failed to bargain in good faith, the 
court compared it to “a mosaic of many pieces, but depending not 
on any one alone.”295  However, a specific violation alone could 
also be evidence of a failure to bargain in good faith as well.296 
6. Examples of Good and Bad Faith 
A failure to bargain in good faith (which illustrates bad faith) is 
typically inferred from a party’s conduct at or away from the 
bargaining table because a participant’s intent to frustrate an 
agreement is rarely articulated.297  As such, a party’s conduct under 
the circumstances is highly probative.  One example of a failure to 
bargain in good faith is surface bargaining.  The term “surface 
bargaining” connotes “going through the motions” of negotiating 
as opposed to demonstrating a genuine desire to reach an 
agreement.298  Thus, the requirement of conferring in good faith is 
more comprehensive than just meeting, or engaging in repetitive 
discussion of formalities that lack any meaning, thereby leading 
one party to declare an impasse or engage in some other anti-
bargaining action.299 
An illustration of these principles in practice is Unbelievable, 
Inc. v. NLRB.300  In Unbelievable, Inc., the employer engaged in a 
series of acts from pre-negotiation through the eventual strike that 
evidenced a desire to continuously goad the union into striking.301  
There never was any desire to actually negotiate with the union.302  
The employer’s attorney scolded union representatives after the 
 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 756. 
 296 Id. 
 297 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 827. 
 298 Id. at 864. 
 299 See, e.g., Wheatland Elec. Coop. Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1953). 
 300 118 F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 301 See id. at 796–99. 
 302 Id. at 797.   
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first bargaining session.  Three sessions followed in five months.303  
The employer never considered the union’s counter-proposal, and 
after the second meeting, the employer’s attorney declared 
impasse.304 
In another demonstrative case, Atlanta Hilton & Tower v. 
International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, AFL-CIO,305 the 
Board set forth seven factors that signal a party’s refusal to bargain 
in good faith.306  In this case, the Board ruled that the employer did 
not negotiate in bad faith, despite failing to honor the union’s 
request for certain financial information, because it was merely 
holding firm on its offer for a one year contract.307  The parties met 
thirteen times, and the overall conduct of the employer was 
justified as “hard bargaining, rather than surface bargaining.”308  
Therefore, whether a party is engaging in hard bargaining instead 
of surface bargaining depends on the facts present in each case.309 
The Board and courts evaluate additional indicia of good faith 
when determining whether the sides have engaged in good faith 
bargaining or surface bargaining.  The proposals and demands 
advanced by each side may be a factor.310  A proposal that one side 
might consider totally unacceptable is not definitive indicia of the 
other party’s absence of good faith.  However, a proposal that is 
clearly meant to frustrate the negotiation process or is plainly 
unreasonable is evidence of bad faith.311  An employer’s 
withdrawal of its sole proposal that includes existing conditions, 
withdrawal of previously agreed-upon proposals, or substitution of 
 
 303 The employer’s initial proposal to one union was a nearly 50% wage reduction, to 
which the union responded by saying it was “outlandish” and “that no union would agree 
to [such demands].” Id.  
 304 Id. 
 305 271 N.L.R.B. 1600 (1984).  
 306 These factors include: (1) delaying tactics; (2) unreasonable bargaining demands; (3) 
unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining; (4) efforts to bypass the union; 
(5) failure to designate an agent with sufficient bargaining authority; (6) withdrawal of 
already agreed-upon provisions; and (7) arbitrary scheduling of meetings. Id. at 1603. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. 
 309 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 828; see also NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 
260, 264 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 310 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 879. 
 311 See Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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new issues after the parties have reached an agreement is generally 
considered evidence of a lack of good faith.312  An employer also 
violates § 8(a)(5) if it unilaterally modifies mandatory subjects of 
bargaining (wages, hours, working conditions).313 
7. The Duty to Furnish Information 
During negotiations, parties are required to furnish the other 
side with additional information so as to understand each other’s 
position.  The Board has continually found that, in order to make 
informed decisions and engage in effective bargaining, there exists 
a duty to provide information.314  A refusal to furnish information 
can severely impede the bargaining process.  A refusal may also 
change the characteristic of a strike from an economic strike to an 
unfair labor practice strike.315  Because this is such an important 
concept of labor law, one must understand when the duty to 
provide information arises and what type of information must be 
provided in those situations. 
In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.,316 the employer 
committed a ULP when it refused to supply the union with 
information necessary to support its claim of not being able to 
afford a wage increase.317  The union asked the employer to 
provide evidence of its claim by allowing a certified public 
accountant to examine the company’s books and financial data.318  
The request was denied.319  In response to this refusal, the union 
requested the company submit “full and complete information with 
respect to its financial standing and profits” to verify its inability to 
pay for a wage increase.320  Again the company refused.321  The 
 
 312 See generally HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 779–85. 
 313 Id. at 903. 
 314 See id. at 958–59. 
 315 Id. at 920. 
 316 351 U.S. 149 (1956).  
 317 See id. at 150 (stating that the employer claimed “it was undercapitalized, had never 
paid dividends, and that an increase of more than two and one-half cents per hour would 
put it out of business”). 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Id. 
 321 Id. at 150–51 (stating that the employer argued the information was not pertinent to 
the negotiations and that the union had no legal right to the documents either). 
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Board agreed with the union and ordered the company to provide 
the union with information to “substantiate the Respondent’s 
position.”322  After the court of appeals refused to enforce the 
Board’s order, the union appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court and eventually prevailed. 
First, the Court set aside any question as to whether the request 
to furnish information itself was overly burdensome on the 
company because it never raised this point on appeal.323  The Court 
concluded that both parties considered the ability to pay as “highly 
relevant.”324  It also opined that claims made by either negotiating 
party must be honest claims.325  Further, 
If such an argument [made by a party] is important 
enough to be present in the give and take of 
bargaining, it is important enough to require some 
sort of proof of its accuracy.  And it would certainly 
not be farfetched for a trier of fact to reach the 
conclusion that bargaining lacks good faith when an 
employer mechanically repeats a claim of inability 
to pay without the slightest effort to substantiate the 
claim.326 
The Court then limited its holding:   
We do not hold, however, that in every case [in] 
which economic inability is raised as an argument 
against increased wages it automatically follows 
that the employees are entitled to substantiating 
evidence.  Each case must turn upon its particular 
facts.  The inquiry must be whether or not under the 
circumstances of the particular case the statutory 
obligation to bargain in good faith has been met.327 
 
 322 Id. at 151. 
 323 Id. 
 324 Id. at 152. 
 325 Id. 
 326 Id. at 152–53. 
 327 Id. at 153–54 (footnote omitted). 
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This duty to furnish information extends during the life of the 
contract and not just to negotiations between the parties.328  It also 
extends to the union; such a request must be made in good faith.329  
A good faith request means that the information must at least be 
necessary and relevant to the relationship between the employer 
and the union in its capacity as employee representative.330  If the 
union request is considered too broad, the employer may request a 
reasonable clarification from the union to demonstrate the 
relevancy of the request, or the employer may comply with the 
request to the extent it believes it must under the law.331  A 
pertinent example of this concept is illustrated in Unbelievable, 
Inc., where the court found that the request for information was 
directly related to the question of substantial wage cuts.332  This 
issue was essential to the union’s representation of its members.333 
Future events may render a request for information moot.334  
One such instance is where the employer no longer possesses the 
duty to furnish information.  However, if the information in 
question could have aided the union in making a bargaining 
decision, the duty to furnish is not rendered moot.  An employer 
may avoid the duty to disclose financial information by making it 
unmistakably apparent to the union that the employer has 
abandoned its position of financial instability.335  In determining 
the validity of that defense, a court will examine the substance of 
the employer’s bargaining position rather than the formal 
statements it has made.336 
Even if an employer presents partial information to the union 
after initially denying such a request, an unfair labor practice may 
still exist.  In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB,337 such events took 
 
 328 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 921. 
 329 See id. at 924–25 (citing Oakland Press Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 994 (1977), aff’d, 598 
F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
 330 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 958. 
 331 Id. at 927. 
 332 See Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 333 See generally id. 
 334 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 931. 
 335 Int’l Chem. Workers Union Council v. NLRB, 467 F.3d 742, 752 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 336 Id. at 749. 
 337 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965).  
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place.338  The union asked for certain lists of employees because of 
concerns that the bargaining unit was slowly being 
outnumbered.339  The employer first denied such requests, but after 
the matter went to the Board, it provided some requested 
information.340  The employer maintained that it had not 
committed an unfair labor practice because it complied with the 
request to furnish information.341  The Board and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed.  The court held that the 
Board’s analysis in the matter was no different than the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Truitt.342  The union had “successfully 
demonstrated the relevance of the data it requested,” according to 
the court.343  The requested information illustrated that the change 
made in the composition of the out-of-bargaining-unit employees 
was relevant as to the administration and policing of current 
agreements as well as to the negotiation of future agreements.344  
Although the parties eventually agreed to a contract, the 
information would have been necessary and relevant to the 
union.345 
Furnishing information is paramount to the bargaining process.  
The duty to provide information, when established to be relevant, 
must be provided in a reasonable manner when this information is 
available, and in such a way that does not impede the bargaining 
process of the parties.346  The employer should avoid furnishing 
information that contains deliberate inaccuracies or is incomplete, 
but the information can be provided in a way no more extensive 
than normal business practice dictates.347  Although an employer 
may defend against this duty by alleging that compliance would be 
too burdensome or expensive, this argument has been met with 
 
 338 See id. at 64–67. 
 339 Id. at 65. 
 340 Id. at 66. 
 341 Id. 
 342 Id. at 69. See generally NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 151 (1956).  
 343 Curtiss-Wright Corp., 347 F.2d at 69.  
 344 Id. at 70.  
 345 The information would have been useful in determining whether the union should 
have utilized another means in changing the composition of the ratio between bargaining 
and non-bargaining unit members. Id.  
 346 See Cincinnati Steel Casting Co. v. NLRB, 86 N.L.R.B. 592, 593 (1949).  
 347 See HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 940–41.  
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little success.348  However, the employer does have other defenses 
against such requests. 
8. Employer Defenses 
The duty to furnish information does not foreclose an employer 
from alleging defenses.  An employer may refuse to furnish certain 
information under particular circumstances.349  In Detroit Edison 
Co. v. NLRB,350 the Court was faced with the novel question of 
whether an employer’s duty to provide relevant information 
included the disclosure of tests and test scores achieved by named 
employees in an employer administrated psychological aptitude 
testing program.351  The union was processing a grievance to 
arbitration and requested the company provide the psychological 
aptitude testing program information.352  The employer replied that 
it could release all but three items to the union: (1) the actual test 
questions, (2) the actual employee answer sheets, and (3) the 
scores linked with the names of the employees who received the 
information.353  An arbitrator refused to grant the union’s demand 
for the three items due to an outstanding unfair labor practice 
charge against the employer.354 
Eventually the employer provided the requested information.  
The raw scores of those who had taken the test were disclosed with 
the examinees’ names deleted.  The company supplied the union 
with sample test questions and with detailed information regarding 
its scoring procedures.355  Finally, the company also offered to turn 
over the scores of any employee who would sign a waiver 
releasing the company psychologist from his confidentiality 
pledge.356  The union declined to seek such releases.357   
 
 348 Id. at 941.  
 349 Id. at 943.  
 350 440 U.S. 301 (1979). 
 351 Id. at 304. 
 352 See id. at 307–08. 
 353 Id.  
 354 Id. at 308.  
 355 Id.   
 356 Id. 
 357 Id.  
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While the employer won the grievance, the Board sided with 
the union because the requested information was relevant and 
necessary to its policing of the parties’ agreement.358  The ALJ 
agreed with the company’s recommendation that a qualified 
neutral psychologist be allowed to examine the information.  
However, the Board and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit ordered all the information delivered to the union because 
the union should be able to determine for itself if a psychologist 
needed to review the test results.359 
On appeal, the Supreme Court first addressed the Board’s 
remedial action against the company, holding that this decision to 
order all information to the union was incorrect.360  In light of the 
company’s expense to prepare the questions, there were serious 
concerns that such information, if handed over to the union, could 
easily be disseminated to the membership.  This would 
compromise the exam and could harm test takers whose scores 
were lower than others.361  Specifically, the Court stated that no 
particular policy supported the union’s position.362  Thus, it held 
that the Board abused its discretion.  The Court opined: 
[a] union’s bare assertion that it needs information 
to process a grievance does not automatically oblige 
the employer to supply all the information in the 
manner requested.  The duty to supply information 
under § 8 (a)(5) turns upon “the circumstances of 
the particular case,” . . . and much the same may be 
said for the type of disclosure that will satisfy that 
duty.363 
The Court also sided with the company on the ULP charges.364  
First, it stated that there is not an absolute right to any relevant 
information in light of the concerns for the confidentiality of the 
 
 358 Id. at 309.  
 359 Id.  
 360 Id. at 314–15. 
 361 Id. 
 362 Id.  
 363 Id. at 315 (citing NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956)).  
 364 Id. at 317–20.  
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psychologist and the individuals’ scores.365  No evidence existed 
that the scores were protected to frustrate the union or serve some 
other devious position.366  The Court then turned to the company’s 
evidence that the prior release of scores had resulted in the 
harassment of lower-scoring employees and illustrated that the 
union’s demands paled in comparison with the company’s 
concerns.367  The employer prevailed by providing more than just a 
generalized contention that the requested information was 
confidential, thereby meeting its burden of proof. 
Combining Truitt and Detroit Edison, the duty to provide 
information begins with the signing of the collective bargaining 
agreement and continues for the life of the agreement to allow the 
parties the ability to properly police their agreement.368  An 
employer risks violating § 8(a)(5) by refusing to provide requested 
information to a union if that information is necessary for the 
union to properly discharge its duties as the bargaining 
representative.369  An employer must furnish information if the 
employer asserts a financial inability to grant the union’s demands. 
9. Financial Information 
There is a distinction between an inability to pay and a 
competitive disadvantage, both of which are cited as concerns with 
respect to requests for financial information.  Financial information 
is relevant and necessary in the context of an employer’s statement 
that it cannot financially support the union’s demands for wages or 
benefits.370  This proposition is illustrated in Truitt, as the Court 
declared that good faith bargaining “requires that claims made by 
either bargainer . . . be honest claims,” and this applies to claims 
related to an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages.371  
 
 365 Id. at 317–18.  
 366 Id. at 318–19.  
 367 Id. at 319–20.  
 368 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 958–59; see also Detroit Edison, 440 U.S. at 303; 
Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152–53. 
 369 NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 217 F.2d 593, 594 (4th Cir. 1954).  
 370 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 963.  
 371 Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152.  
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Arguments of this nature must be supported through proof of its 
accuracy.372 
If a party is claiming an inability to pay, it must be willing to 
support its contention with more than mere words.373  In the 2004 
decision of AMF Trucking & Warehousing, Inc.,374 the Supreme 
Court was forced to examine a company’s assertions made during 
negotiations to determine whether it had effectively stated that the 
employer could not pay for increases to the health insurance and 
pension fund.  The Board discussed the company’s response to 
these requests in some detail: 
The Respondent stated that the [u]nion was asking 
for “pie in the sky,” that the Respondent had 
purchased the Company “in distress a year and a 
half earlier, and that the company was still in 
distress.”  The Respondent also said that it was 
“fighting to [stay] alive,” and was “weaker this 
year” than it had been in previous years.375 
The Board concluded that the employer’s statements did not 
meet the threshold test because the statements neither explicitly 
stated that insufficient assets existed nor that such conditions 
would cause the employer to go out of business by agreeing to the 
union’s demands.376  The Board determined that the standard for 
“inability to pay” denotes “that the company presently has 
insufficient assets to pay or that it would have insufficient assets to 
pay during the life of the contract that is being negotiated.  Thus, 
inability to pay is inextricably linked to nonsurvival in 
business.”377   
Furthermore, supplying financial information without allowing 
the union an opportunity to directly examine company records 
might be insufficient disclosure.378  However, an employer may set 
 
 372 See id. at 152–53.  
 373 In football parlance, that might be akin to “walking the walk and talking the talk.”  
 374 342 N.L.R.B. 1125 (2004).  
 375 Id. at 1125. 
 376 See id. at 1126–27. 
 377 Id. at 1125. 
 378 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 965.  
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parameters for the union to review and verify an employer’s 
inability to pay.379 
C. General Considerations 
The collective bargaining process is based on several concepts, 
most principally being the cooperative negotiation process.  This is 
founded upon the notions of mutual understanding and teamwork 
between the bargaining parties.  However, while both sides 
endeavor to bargain in good faith in hopes of reaching a mutually 
amicable settlement, each party may exert economic pressure upon 
the other bargaining participant.  These tools of economic pressure 
include the lockout,380 the unfair practice strike,381 and the 
economic strike.382  The use of each of these activities may 
influence a bargaining party’s negotiation strategy and the 
disclosure of information between the parties.  These tools assist 
the parties to bargain in good faith, which is the overall objective 
of labor law. 
While the duty to bargain does not require each side to engage 
in marathon discussions, the parties must fully negotiate in good 
faith.  However, even if the parties bargain in good faith, an 
impasse still may occur.  This occurs when both sides are engaging 
each other with a sincere intent to reach an agreement but cannot 
find that necessary common ground to make such an accord.  An 
impasse is defined as the point in time during negotiations when 
the parties are warranted in assuming that further bargaining would 
 
 379 NLRB v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 755 F.2d 260, 261 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that the 
employer’s request was reasonably related to the audit, the qualifications were 
appropriate, and the employer expressed willingness to discuss the qualifications, to 
which the union was opposed).  
 380 See Am. Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 (stating “there is nothing in the 
statute which would imply that the right to strike ‘carries with it’ the right exclusively to 
determine the timing and duration of all work stoppages”).  
 381 In an unfair labor practice strike, strikers are to be reinstated to their former 
positions upon the conclusion of the ULP strike.  The employer must reinstate the 
employee even if the organization had hired other workers during the strike. See NLRB v. 
Int’l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50–51 (1972).  
 382 In an economic strike, an employer is able to freely fire and hire employees or 
replacements and may, without fear of legal recourse, refuse requests for reinstatement 
from a striker who was replaced during a strike. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 
304 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1938).  
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be futile.383  To determine whether an impasse exists, one must 
examine the totality of the circumstances384 and unique factors 
surrounding the parties’ bargaining relationship.385  Upon reaching 
this point, an employer may make unilateral changes in working 
conditions so long as the changes had been offered to the union 
during negotiations.386  In addition to the employer being able to 
implement his last offer, the participants may also look to other 
tools within labor law to assist in applying pressure to bring a 
mutually agreeable resolution.387  Upon reaching an impasse, the 
duty to bargain is not terminated.  Instead, it is suspended and may 
be reinstated upon the happening of a condition or circumstance 
that renews the possibility of fruitful discussion amongst the 
parties.388 
V. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES 
The bargaining between the NFL and NFLPA is increasingly 
turning contentious.  While some issues may raise less controversy 
than others, it appears that both sides are having problems finding 
common ground even on the less controversial non-economic 
issues.  For the purposes of the upcoming collective bargaining 
process, and as articulated by Commissioner Goodell in his letter 
to Mr. Upshaw, major issues include (1) addressing those financial 
 
 383 HIGGINS, supra note 251, at 989.  
 384 See id. at 989–95.   
 385 Unique factors include the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the 
negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to which there is disagreement, and 
the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations.  
Additional factors may include whether there has been a strike or the union has consulted 
the employees regarding this possibility, fluidity of the parties’ positions, continuation of 
bargaining, statements or understandings of the parties concerning impasse, union animus 
as evidenced by previous events, the bargaining history of the parties, the importance of 
the issues and the extent of the difference or opposition amongst the parties, the parties 
bargaining history, any willingness by the parties to further consider the issue, time 
between bargaining sessions, and the number of bargaining sessions amongst the parties. 
See id. at 990–95.  
 386 See generally NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (enumerating certain 
circumstances that might justify unilateral employer action). 
 387 As mentioned above, these tools include the economic strike, ULP strike, and 
lockout. See supra notes 380–82 and accompanying text. 
 388 See Gulf States Mfg. v. NLRB, 704 F.2d 1390, 1399 (5th Cir. 1983).  
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issues that the League perceives as being obsolete in the current 
NFL (the recalculation of League revenue as it applies to the salary 
cap and team allocation of player salaries) and the considerations 
as to whether the NFL has a duty to disclose its financial 
information to the Union, (2) curbing rookie salaries through a 
rookie wage scale and, to a certain extent, (3) addressing player 
discipline issues.  Taking the above-mentioned topics together, and 
when considering the entire bargaining relationship between the 
parties thus far, it is unclear whether the NFL is bargaining in good 
faith. 
A. The National Football League: The League Is Not Disclosing 
Financial Information Because It Is Not Alleging an Inability 
to Pay and Thus Is Bargaining in Good Faith389 
The NFL is not going to provide any financial information to 
the Union because it is not claiming an inability to pay.390  As 
such, there is no duty to open League financial information for 
review.391  Under the present CBA, Owners assume all of the risks 
and the players reap the vast majority of the financial revenues.392  
 
 389 This viewpoint is portrayed by Jeffrey F. Levine.  
 390 Dennis Curran, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Football League, 
Panel Address at the Sports Lawyers Conference (May 16, 2009); see also Smith 
Addresses Industry Lawyers, NFL Executives, in Chicago, NFLPA.COM (May 19, 2009), 
http://www.nflplayers.com/Articles/Public-News/Smith-Addresses-Industry-Lawyers-
NFL-Executives-in-Chicago (“We are not claiming an inability to pay.  We’re not going 
to open our books.  We don’t have to open our books.” (quoting Mr. Curren) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 391 See Smith Addresses Industry Lawyers, supra note 390. 
 392 Jim Corbett, NFL Owners Setting Priorities for CBA Negotiations, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2009-03-23-owners-
priorities_N.htm [hereinafter Corbett, NFL Owners Setting Priorities].  Owners opted out 
in May 2008 because the deal paid players nearly 60% of revenues.  This large 
percentage, coupled with rising operating costs, mounting stadium debt, and a tough 
economy, caused NFL ownership to become more risk adverse.  Thus, the NFL wants 
players to assume more of their risk in regard to rising player costs.  Commissioner 
Goodell asserted that player costs increased by $500 million over 2008 and 2009, and 
that “[t]he risk falls entirely on the clubs here.  We have to make sure we address that 
issue in a responsible fashion, including our partners.”  The NFLPA responded by saying 
that players take plenty of risk already, by playing in each game each week. Interview 
with DeMaurice Smith, National Football League Players’ Association Executive 
Director, SPORTING NEWS TODAY, Oct. 7, 2009, at 20, available at http://today.sporting 
news.com/sportingnewstoday/20091007/?pg=20&pm=1&u1=friend#pg20.  
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The NFL is the only sports league in which every team has a 
player payroll in excess of $100 million; the average player salary 
this year is $2 million plus an additional $300,000 per player in 
benefits.393  This is all occurring in the greatest economic 
downturn since the Great Depression.  While the League can still 
exist under these conditions, it is time to balance its financial risk 
by working with the Union to create a new CBA that is 
foundationally sound. 
Ownership may have opted out of the 2006 CBA because this 
accord altered how the NFL and its players divided League 
revenues.394  After the 2006 CBA’s ratification, players received a 
larger share of revenues.  These revenues now include all stadium 
revenues related to football.395  Under the current Agreement, 
stadium revenues include concessions, parking, local advertising 
and promotion, signage, magazine advertising, local sponsorship 
agreements, stadium clubs, and luxury box income.  All of these 
revenue sources were excluded in prior CBAs.396  Thus, the current 
CBA casts significant financial risk on Ownership by substantially 
raising the likelihood of lucrative player salaries and also 
artificially inflates the salary cap. 
As a result of this increase in revenue being directed to player 
salaries, the salary caps for each successive year are spiraling out 
of control.  Small market teams cannot keep up with the 
burdensome costs forced upon them because of their comparatively 
small consumer base.397  Small market teams are not as financially 
well suited as large market teams to shoulder this financial 
burden.398  Consequently, the relative inequities between the 
NFL’s small market and large market teams exacerbate this player 
salary issue.399  Although the League agreed to the current CBA 
 
 393 Leahy, supra note 14 (citing post from National Football League spokesman Greg 
Aiello).  
 394 Deubert & Wong, supra note 43, at 181. 
 395 Id.  
 396 Id. (citing the NFL-CBA). 
 397 See Mark Curnutte, Financial Gap Widening Between NFL’s Haves and Have-Nots, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2007-02-25-
financial-gap_x.htm. 
 398 Id. 
 399 Id. 
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through good faith bargaining, allocating nearly 60% of League 
revenues to player salaries and benefits through a mechanism that 
was invented in 1993 is untenable.  It is an obsolete manner of 
operating the NFL.  This obsolete system gives Ownership no 
incentive to invest in the game. 
The manner in which the NFL and the Union operated in 1993 
is no longer valid.  In the current economy, the Player’s 
Association needs to be an equal partner in the League’s recovery 
back to financial equilibrium.  Although both sides have enjoyed a 
tremendous period of growth since 1993, it is time for both labor 
and management to make concessions for the betterment of 
professional football.  As steward of the game, the League is 
consulting with every necessary party in hopes of setting a 
foundation to ensure that the NFL will be as successful in the next 
century as it was in the twentieth century.  It is the League’s intent 
to work with all necessary stakeholders to achieve cost certainty, 
including with the Union. 
1. The Disclosure of Financial Statements Is Not Necessary to 
Understand the League’s Bargaining Position That the 
Current CBA Is Obsolete 
In regard to financial issues, the NFL did not opt out of the 
2006 CBA because it was unable to pay the players.  Instead, the 
League opted out because this method of salary compensation is 
obsolete.400  The current CBA’s salary calculation and distribution 
is derived from a method that was created in 1993.  Since then, 
League revenues have gone up extensively due to monies derived 
through the NFL’s stadium construction initiative and other 
initiatives.401  Now, team salary commitments are unreasonably 
inflated and are pushing player compensation into an unhealthy 
realm.  It is time to renegotiate the formula for salary cap 
calculation. 
 
 400 See generally NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, supra note 183. 
 401 Judy Battista, In N.F.L.’s Labor Talks, the Rumblings of War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 
2009, at SP7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/23/sports/football/ 
23labor.html. 
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The NFL is bargaining in the best faith possible under the 
circumstances.  Ownership seeks to engage in sincere negotiations 
with the Union to establish a system that fits the modern NFL 
revenue generation model.  The League will not release any 
financial information because the Players’ Association knows the 
figures;402 the Union also is keenly aware that the NFL’s largest 
costs are player salaries, which were in excess of $4.5 billion for 
the 2009 season.403  Further, Ownership is not under any obligation 
to furnish information because the League has not stated that it is 
unable to abide by the financial terms of the CBA.  Despite this 
fact, the Union continues to argue that the Owners do possess some 
duty to disclose financial information to the NFLPA.   However, 
the duty to provide information under § 8(a)(5) does not turn on 
the bare assertions of the Players’ Association.404  Instead, one 
must examine the specific circumstances of this case.405  In other 
words, the information must be necessary and relevant to the 
bargaining relationship between the parties.406  Here, in addition to 
the League not pleading an inability to pay, the Union already 
knows this financial information.  Thus, there is no duty to furnish 
information. 
One way in which the NFLPA could get a snapshot of League 
financials would be to audit the corporate filings of the Green Bay 
Packers.  The Packers are a publicly owned entity and thus the 
financial information is available.  According to its financial 
statements, the Packers earned $20.1 million in operating profits 
during the 2008 season.407  This healthy profit substantiates the 
League’s argument that it did not opt out of the CBA because of 
financial inability.  Since the profits of the Packers act as a 
bellwether reading into the financial health of the NFL as a whole, 
 
 402 Tom Curran, Goodell on Work Stoppage, NFL INSIDER REP. (Mar. 23, 2009), 
http://blogs.nbcsports.com/home/archives/2009/03/goodell-on-work-stoppage.html 
(quoting Commissioner Goodell). 
 403 Id. 
 404 See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979) (citing NLRB v. Truitt 
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956)). 
 405 See id. at 314 (citing Truitt, 351 U.S. at 153). 
 406 See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1966). 
 407 Brown & Prine, supra note 203. 
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the League has no obligation to furnish financial information to the 
Union.408 
The NFL seeks to bargain with the NFLPA and come to an 
agreement ensuring that there will not be a work stoppage.  The 
League is focusing on its priorities in the collective bargaining 
process, achieving cost certainty, and working with the Union to 
reach an agreement.409  There is no need to engage in a “lock-in”410 
or create artificial deadlines, as these will obstruct the natural 
development of negotiations between the parties.  At this point, the 
League has instructed franchises to take preparatory measures for a 
possible work stoppage because this is prudent.  One needs 
revenue in order to run a league; this is why signing deals such as 
the one with DirecTV411 was paramount regardless of whether or 
not there is a labor stoppage.  While the parties are seeking to 
come to an accord, one must also prepare to face the potential 
scenario where football will not be played.  Thus, cost containment 
is an important element to the NFL’s success. 
2. Cost Containment Includes a True Rookie Wage Scale and 
Modifying Player Discipline Mechanisms 
One element of cost containment paramount to establishing a 
solid financial foundation is the curbing of excess and unnecessary 
costs.  The most effective method to effectuate this change is 
through regulating rookie compensation.412  Both management and 
the Union must work together to curb rising salaries for those 
players that were selected in the early portion of the NFL Draft.  
The simple and most obvious way to rein in over-inflated rookie 
salaries is through the implementation of a rookie salary cap. 
The League is proposing that a rookie wage scale and a 
mechanism that credits against NFL club owners’ expenses be 
 
 408 See Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152.  
 409 Corbett, NFL Owners Setting Priorities, supra note 392.  
 410 Mullen, NFL Rejects Players’, supra note 208. 
 411 See Matthew Futterman, NFL, DirecTV Extend Pact in $4 Billion Deal, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 24, 2009, at B5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12378650349 
0122053.html. 
 412 Goodell: Rookie Pay Scale ‘Ridiculous,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 3, 2008, 
available at http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80909cc9&template=with-
video&confirm=true.  
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implemented into the new CBA.413  Under this proposal, these 
expenses will be deducted from revenues that determine the NFL 
salary cap, thereby providing a cost savings.414  It is in the best 
interests of the game and all of those involved to insert into the 
CBA cost containment mechanisms.  One only needs to look at 
such mechanisms and how they helped restore the vitality of 
professional hockey after the NHL lockout.415  Therefore, it is 
paramount to include the proper mechanisms in the new CBA to 
stop the absurd escalation of salaries for unproven rookie 
players.416 
In addition, League franchises must possess the ability to 
recover the significant money that each organization invests in 
players as signing bonuses if that individual breaches his contract 
or refuses to perform.  This issue is complicated by the fact that 
grievances such as these are overseen by a judge who is overtly 
biased toward the Union.417  Pursuant to the 1993 consent decree, 
all labor-related issues between the parties fall under the 
supervision of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Minnesota.418  While Judge Doty’s court has resolved disputes 
over the terms of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement and the 
parallel CBA over the last sixteen years, he is no longer 
impartial.419  A prime example illustrating both the League’s 
inability to recover signing bonuses from players who breach and 
Judge Doty’s bias is the events surrounding the incarceration of 
Michael Vick. 
After signing a contract that made him the highest paid player 
in the NFL, which included a $20 million signing bonus, Vick was 
indicted on charges stemming from his financing of a dog-fighting 
 
 413 NFL Presents Economic Proposal for New CBA to NFLPA, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=sbd.main&ArticleID=134723. 
 414 Id. 
 415 Michael K. Ozanian & Kurt Badenhausen, NFL on the Rebound, FORBES.COM, Nov. 
9, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/2006/11/09/nhl-teams-owners-biz_06nhl_cz_mo_kb_ 
1109nhlintro.html. 
 416 Goodell: Rookie Pay Scale ‘Ridiculous,’ supra note 412. 
 417 See generally White v. Nat’l Football League, 585 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 418 Id. at 1133. 
 419 Id. 
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ring.420  On August 27, 2007, Vick pled guilty to the charges and 
was sentenced to nearly two years in federal prison.421  
Commissioner Goodell suspended Vick indefinitely without pay 
shortly thereafter.422  The NFL also initiated a non-injury grievance 
procedure on behalf of the Atlanta Falcons, Vick’s former team, in 
order to recuperate part of the $19.97 million in roster and signing 
bonuses the franchise had paid Vick, as he was still under contract 
with the team until 2014.423  Pursuant to the Consent Agreement 
and CBA, a Special Master presided over a hearing to determine 
whether Vick had to give the money back.  Special Master 
Burbank ruled in favor of the Falcons, determining that Vick 
needed to repay the bonus money.424  Vick appealed to the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Minnesota, where Judge Doty 
reversed the Special Master’s ruling.  The court ruled that Vick had 
already earned his bonus prior to his indefinite suspension.425  The 
League appealed, but the district court’s decision was upheld.  The 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that based on the language 
used in the CBA, Vick’s bonus was fully earned prior to his legal 
problems.426 
Although Vick seemingly violated the terms of his contract, he 
was still able to keep the vast majority of his signing bonus.  The 
League and the Union must remedy the anti-forfeiture provision in 
the CBA that the arbiters relied upon.  Changing this term will 
allow franchises to recover funds from a player who breaches his 
contract or engages in conduct that is contrary to the best interests 
of football.427  This would free up money to compensate players 
who actually perform pursuant to or outperform their contracts.  
Both the district court and the appellate court misinterpreted the 
 
 420 Michael S. Schmidt, Vick Pleads Guilty in Dog-Fighting Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/27/sports/football/27cnd-vick.html. 
 421 Id.  
 422 Id. 
 423 Deubert & Wong, supra note 43, at 220–21. 
 424 “The Special Master is an arbitrator that has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes 
arising out of a wide range of articles in the CBA. . . .  As of 2009, the current Special 
Master is University of Pennsylvania Law School professor Richard Burbank.” Id. at 203.   
 425 White v. Nat’l Football League, 533 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (D. Minn. 2008), aff’d, 
585 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 426 White v. Nat’l Football League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1143 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 427 White, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 931. 
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relevant provisions within the CBA; thus, the parties must change 
this provision so that it unequivocally protects franchises that are 
injured by non-performing or breaching players and enables other 
players to receive that money being forfeited. 
The parties must also agree to extricate themselves from the 
supervision of Judge Doty.  Throughout the latter portions of this 
CBA’s life, Judge Doty has demonstrated overt bias toward the 
Union through his comments about the bargaining process between 
the parties during the last twenty years.428  It is time to end the 
unnecessary dependence on the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Minnesota and instead work with all necessary stakeholders to 
establish a new foundation that will mutually benefit all parties 
involved.  The League is confident that the NFL and the Union can 
continue to bargain in good faith without the unduly burdensome 
oversight of any court. 
3. The System Needs to Change 
It is clear that major provisions of this Agreement are obsolete.  
The NFL needs to work with all stakeholders to chart a new 
strategy so that the next century of professional football is as 
successful as the last decade.  However, a new strategy must be 
negotiated that equally distributes risk amongst the parties and 
bargaining must occur free from the supervision of a biased 
referee.  Although the NFLPA alleges that the current system is 
mutually beneficial, this statement is erroneous and disingenuous.  
In fact, the system is broken. 
With each passing year, the disparity between large market and 
small market clubs continues to widen.429  The chief constraint on 
 
 428 Judge Doty stated that the  
[NFL Owners] pretend they’re getting beaten around.  Well, they did, 
initially, but they had a position that was not legally sound. . . .  I 
think if you ask Tagliabue, he would say, “The whole thing has come 
out our way.”  Because, even though they complain about it . . . all 
they’ve done is make tons of money.  
White, 585 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Jay Weiner, NFL’s Toughest Official Wields a Gavel, 
Not a Whistle, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS J., Jan. 28, 2008, at 8,  available at 
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/57905 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 429 Brian Karpuk, Will There Be an NFL Lockout in 2011?, NEWSBURGLAR (June 3, 
2009), http://newsburglar.com/2009/06/03/will-there-be-an-nfl-lockout-in-2011. 
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each club’s finances is the enormous cost that player salaries 
embody.430  To this end, major stakeholders must work together to 
implement a system that curbs the NFL’s largest costs: player 
salaries.431  Thus, a rookie salary cap will do much to ease the 
trend of skyrocketing rookie salaries, especially those taken in the 
early portions of the first round.  In the meantime, the NFL must 
continue to find new ways to offset its substantial costs.  While the 
NFL has negotiated deals that guarantee that revenues will be 
received in the event of a labor stoppage, any sort of disruption of 
games is contrary to the best interests of the game.  The League 
has presented substantial reasons for its position to the Union and 
is negotiating in good faith.  Thus, the NFL is and has been 
bargaining in the best faith possible under the circumstances and 
therefore did not engage in any unfair labor practices. 
B. The National Football League Players Association: The 
National Football League Is Not Bargaining in Good Faith432 
Ever since the Owners unanimously voted on May 20, 2008 to 
opt out of the current CBA, the Union has repeatedly asked for the 
rationale of this decision.433  The League’s continued response is 
that this deal is not affording all clubs a chance to be competitive.  
As professional football is a multi-billion dollar enterprise, it is 
difficult without viewing the NFL’s financial information to 
understand exactly how this current Agreement fails to foster 
competitiveness amongst the thirty-two franchises.  Since the 2006 
season, the most recent year the CBA was extended, eight different 
teams have appeared in the Super Bowl.434  The financial state of 
the League has never been healthier.  There is no reason to change 
any element of the current financial structure without tangible 
 
 430 Larry Weisman, NFL Salaries ’08: Big Ben Smiling as Highest-Paid Player, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2008-11-05-
salaries_N.htm; see also NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, supra note 183. 
 431 NFL Owners Meetings: Work Stoppage Unlikely After CBA Opt-Out, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, May 21, 2008, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily. 
com/article/121029.  
 432 This viewpoint is portrayed by Bram Maravent. 
 433 NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, supra note 183. 
 434 Superbowl History, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/superbowl/history (last visited Feb. 
25, 2010). 
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evidence; mere words do not suffice.  The Union has presented its 
impression of the League’s financial health in economic reports 
that were quickly rebuffed by management.  The only justification 
the Union keeps hearing from Ownership is that the current deal is 
not financially workable.  Facts prove otherwise: teams are 
shelling out big money on player contracts and, from an overall 
perspective, multiple television deals are already signed, sealed, 
and delivered to the League’s coffers that guarantee payment even 
in the event of a strike or lockout.  If this is the case, then the 
natural train of thought is to have Ownership demonstrate why this 
current CBA is not financially viable.  As Ownership is unwilling 
to provide any financial information despite the Union’s repeated 
attempts to request and obtain these figures, the League is not 
bargaining in good faith. 
1. The Disclosure of Financial Statements Is Vital to 
Understanding the League’s Bargaining Position 
Ownership unanimously opted out of the 2006–12 CBA in 
May 2008.  In doing so, the League released, in part, this 
statement: 
A collective bargaining agreement has to work 
for both sides.  If the agreement provides 
inadequate incentives to invest in the future, it will 
not work for management or labor.  And, in the 
context of a professional sports league, if the 
agreement does not afford all clubs an opportunity 
to be competitive, the [L]eague can lose its appeal. 
The NFL earns very substantial revenues.  But 
the clubs are obligated by the CBA to spend 
substantially more than half their revenues—almost 
$4.5 billion this year alone—on player costs.  In 
addition, as we have explained to the [U]nion, the 
clubs must spend significant and growing amounts 
on stadium construction, operations and 
improvements to respond to the interests and 
demands of our fans.  The current labor agreement 
does not adequately recognize the costs of 
generating the revenues of which the players 
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receive the largest share; nor does the [A]greement 
recognize that those costs have increased 
substantially—and at an ever increasing rate—in 
recent years during a difficult economic climate in 
our country.  As a result, under the terms of the 
current agreement, the clubs’ incentive to invest in 
the game is threatened.435 
A CBA has to work for both sides.  The NFLPA is not 
disagreeing with this statement, but disagrees with Ownership’s 
declaration that costs are too high.436  This assertion must be 
supported by some kind of proof.  The League insists that the 
Union has this information; some have stated off the record that 
these documents are protected by a strict confidentiality 
agreement, and as such are not available to the public.  The 
League’s thirty-two teams have refused to provide financial data to 
support their collective cry that they are not earning enough to 
afford their labor costs.437 
The NFLPA possesses some financial information as each 
year’s salary cap is based on the League’s yearly total revenue.  
The NFLPA also has access to the Green Bay Packers’ financial 
data.438  Because the Packers are publicly owned, this information 
was publicly available and used by economists Kevin M. Murphy 
and Robert H. Topel, who issued The Economics of NFL Team 
Ownership, which was distributed by the NFLPA to the Owners 
prior to the January 2009 Super Bowl.439  The study also compiled 
the League’s financial information, as it was provided to the 
authors by the NFLPA.440 
The results were astounding.  The Packers’ revenue, when 
compared against the estimates of Forbes magazine (just under 
 
 435 NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, supra note 183. 
 436 NFL Leader Says Lockout Almost Certain, NBCSPORTS.COM, Feb. 4, 2010, 
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/35247167/ns/sports-nfl/. 
 437 MURPHY & TOPEL, supra note 12, at 1. 
 438 Id. 
439  See, e.g., Rick Maese, This One Could Get Ugly, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 31, 2009, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-01-31/sports/0901300188_1_nfl-commissioner-
roger-goodell-ravens-owner-steve-bisciotti-raymond-james-stadium (noting that the 
Union “paraded around” this report).  
 440 MURPHY & TOPEL, supra note 12, at 3. 
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$250 million), was slightly higher.441  The report noted that “the 
Green Bay Packers have been approximately in the middle of all 
NFL teams in financial performance as reported by Forbes 
indicating that the team is not an outlier.”442  Player costs and 
operating income were also similar.443 
The NFL’s revenue, when the economists considered the 
Union’s data against the data of Forbes, was also higher.444  Player 
costs were the same ($4 billion).445  According to the study, 
estimated team values have risen from $288.1 million to $1.04 
billion since the 1998 CBA extension; these figures were 
supported by data from the sales of seven NFL franchises since 
1998.446  Most recently, the economists used the December 2008 
sale of the Miami Dolphins to New York real estate billionaire 
Stephen Ross as proof that the current economic problems that 
many businesses encounter are not affecting the value of NFL 
franchises.447 
The study also discussed one of the League’s reasons for 
renegotiating the current CBA—that the teams are carrying too 
much debt.  To examine this statement, the economists utilized the 
average ratio of total debt to team equity value and the ratio of 
average total debt to average team equity value.448  Total debt has 
actually decreased since the 1998 CBA extension, and total debt 
has increased slower than team value.449  Thus, as the economists 
expressed, “debt is less of an issue for NFL teams now than it has 
been in the past.”450  When taking into account both team value 
and operating income, the study states that between 2000 and 
2008, the average return for an NFL owner is between “$49 
million and $131 million per year depending on the year, with 
 
 441 Id. at 4. 
 442 Id. at 4 n.3. 
 443 Id. at 5–6. 
 444 Id. at 6 (noting that the Union reported the NFL’s revenue as over $7 billion 
compared to $6.5 billion as estimated by Forbes). 
 445 Id.  
 446 Id. at 8–9. 
 447 Id. at 10. 
 448 Id. at 12. 
 449 Id. 
 450 Id. 
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average financial returns in recent years that have typically 
exceeded $100 million per year,” proving that NFL team 
ownership is not a losing proposition.451 
Only one team, according to the report (citing Forbes), had an 
operating loss over the last five years.452  The Detroit Lions had a 
net operating loss of $3.1 million in 2008, according to Forbes.453  
Because of this information, Professor Murphy and Professor 
Topel concluded “it is difficult to make a case that the owners are 
not earning enough to pay the players what they are due to make 
under the current CBA.”454  Regarding player salaries, the study 
found that the current salary cap and free agency system in place 
has only brought the players’ percentage of salaries to a level near 
the overall average since 1994, and that reducing salaries, as has 
been suggested by Ownership, would reduce players’ salaries to a 
level below the historical average since the 1994 CBA.455  The 
Agreement has a ceiling, and therefore, the salary cap and player 
benefits cannot be more than 61.68% of projected revenues in any 
year; this provides “a substantial cushion” for Ownership.456  In 
sum, team values have quadrupled over the last decade and 
franchises made on average $25 million last year; these figures are 
a far cry from a system in need of significant change.457 
In response to this report, NFL Commissioner Goodell stated, 
There’s a lot of fiction in that report. . . .  The 
[U]nion has very in-depth knowledge of our 
economics and they also know our largest cost is 
player costs.  What’s happened is the system has 
changed and the environment has changed. . . .  The 
 
 451 Id. at 13. 
 452 Id. 
 453 Id. 
 454 Id. at 14. 
 455 Id. at 14–15. 
 456 Id. at 15. 
 457 Aaron Kuriloff, NFL Lockout Would Cost Owners $15.5 Billion, Union Lawyer 
Says, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601079&sid=asJ1X9A8a.LI&refer=home.  
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model has shifted over the years and we will 
address that in negotiations.458 
NFLPA Executive Director Smith has sent a letter to 
Commissioner Goodell asking for a more detailed explanation of 
the Owners’ decision to opt out of the Agreement and has made 
repeated requests for financial information.459  Smith also 
demanded that the NFL “turn over all audited financial statements 
[and] profit-loss information” to the Union.460  Despite these good-
faith demands, Goodell refuses to release this financial 
information, alleging that the Union “‘knows our revenue down to 
almost a penny’ because of revenue figures used to compute the 
[L]eague’s salary cap.”461  Goodell’s statements are fraught with 
the idea that the current economics of the deal are not working.  
However, the NFL will not provide financial statements to support 
its contention because the Union knows only one figure: that 
nearly 60% of League revenues must be spent on player salaries 
and benefits.462 
The League has postured in many ways that might indicate 
poor financial health, such as staff layoffs and allowing teams to 
opt out of the League-run pension, retirement, and 401(k) plans for 
club employees.463  However, after repeated requests, no tangible 
 
 458 Associated Press, Goodell: Union Report Inaccurate, ESPN.COM, Jan. 30, 2009, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=3872330&type=story. 
 459 Liz Mullen, NFLPA’s Smith Sends Letter to Goodell Asking About CBA Opt Out, 
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, May 19, 2009, http://www.sports 
businessdaily.com/article/130321 [hereinafter Mullen, NFLPA’s Smith Sends Letter]; see 
also Mike Florio, Union Poses 10 Questions to NFL, NBC SPORTS, Mar. 25, 2010, 
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/03/25/union-poses-10-questions-to-nfl 
[hereinafter Florio, Union Poses]. 
 460 Alex Marvez, ‘New Players’ Union Head Begins Posturing, FOX SPORTS, May 18, 
2009, http://msn.foxsports.com/nfl/story/9586506/New-players’-union-head-begins-
posturing. 
 461 Id. 
 462 See Sportsdoc, The Plight of Former National Football League Players Heads Back 
to the Senate, SPORTS BUS. NEWS (Sept. 19, 2007, 12:10 AM), http://sportsbiznews. 
blogspot.com/2007/09/plight-of-former-national-football.html. See generally Liz Mullen, 
Union Economist: NFL Numbers Don’t Add Up, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS J., 
Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/64542. 
 463 Daniel Kaplan & Liz Mullen, NFL Owners OK Opt-Out of Pension Plans, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS J., Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/ 
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information has been delivered to the Union to support 
Ownership’s contention that the current economic structure is not 
working.464  Under the precedent of Truitt, a request for 
information must be made in good faith; thus, it must at least be a 
request for necessary and relevant information crucial to the 
relationship between the employer and the union in its capacity as 
employee representative.465  Surely financial information is both 
necessary and relevant insofar as determining how the current 
economic structure is or is not working.  This is not a situation like 
Detroit Edison where the information would be considered a trade 
secret or harmful to the employees.466  In AMF Trucking, the 
Board stated that an inability to pay means that an employer does 
not have the money to pay now or for the life of the contract the 
current wage and benefit terms in place.467  The League insists that 
all of its clubs will not continue to remain competitive if the 
current economic structure exists and that the clubs’ incentive to 
invest in the game is threatened.  The League must provide 
financial information to the extent it can support these statements.  
As the League has not provided this information, and because it is 
the party that opted out of the Agreement, the League is not 
bargaining in good faith. 
2. A Rookie Wage Scale Already Exists 
Another reason Ownership opted out of the current CBA is that 
it feels that the current salaries for rookies are too high and is thus 
seeking a rookie salary cap.  However, a rookie wage scale already 
exists in the form of a rookie wage pool,468 and it is up to the teams 
to spend their money properly.  Second, the share of rookie salaries 
is wrongly considered by the League from a cumulative 
 
article/62186; NFL Chief Takes Pay Cut After Layoffs, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 25, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/25/news/newsmakers/nfl_commissioner/index.htm. 
 464 See Mullen, NFLPA’s Smith Sends Letter, supra note 459. 
 465 See generally NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); see also HIGGINS, 
supra note 251, at 958. 
 466 See generally Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). 
 467 See AMF Trucking & Warehousing, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 1125, 1126 (2004). 
 468 Mike Florio, 2009 Rookie Pool Numbers Are Released, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Apr. 
28, 2009), http://www.profootballtalk.com/2009/04/28/2009-rookie-pool-numbers-are-
released [hereinafter Florio, 2009 Rookie Pool Numbers]. 
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perspective.  Third, rookies do not take money away from veteran 
players.  Thus, because there are already mechanisms in place to 
address the situation, there is no need to bargain over the issue. 
The NFL allocates a maximum cap value to each of its thirty-
two teams that may be devoted to all of a team’s draft picks.  This 
amount is based upon the number of draft picks, the round the 
player is selected, and the overall spot within the round in which 
the picks are made.469  This wage pool provides teams with a limit 
on the amount of money in base salaries they can allocate toward 
rookie salaries each year.  A rookie wage scale would establish 
rigid and restrictive guidelines for rookie salaries based on where 
players are drafted.  A number would essentially be earmarked for 
players depending upon where they were drafted without 
exception.  The current system, however, is based on the teams’ 
salary cap figure, and rookie salaries amount to around 4% of all 
franchise salaries.470  The only difference between the current 
system and a wage scale is the assigning of a particular number to 
the slot to which each player is drafted. 
One reason the League is pushing the notion that a rookie wage 
scale is necessary is that such a system would shift the blame from 
the team to the player.  Under a wage scale, the player cannot be 
upset with a set salary, only with the team that drafted him or the 
spot where he was drafted.471  A slotting system, such as the one 
within the National Basketball Association, would take any 
negotiating leverage away from the player and his team.472  
Additionally, the League is trying to drive a wedge between 
rookies and veterans.473  The veterans, however, should be more 
upset with Owners who continue to perpetrate this massive 
financial feeding frenzy that has become the top half of the first 
 
 469 Id. 
 470 Dan Graziano, Crabtree Aside, NFL Doesn’t Need a Rookie Wage Scale, NFL 
FANHOUSE (Aug. 17, 2009), http://nfl.fanhouse.com/2009/08/17/crabtree-aside-nfl-
doesnt-need-a-rookie-wage-scale [hereinafter Graziano, Crabtree Aside]. 
 471 Id. 
 472 Id. 
 473 Id. 
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round of the NFL Draft.  The Union has no control over the money 
teams choose to spend on bonuses to rookies.474 
The argument that veteran players are harmed by the current 
system is also misguided.  After the wage pool money is allotted, 
which amounts to 4% of the total salary cap, there is 96% of the 
salary cap pie available to veteran players.475  The economists 
commissioned by the NFLPA to study NFL financials stated that 
Ownership’s argument that teams are paying more for rookies than 
for veterans is “without merit.”476  Furthermore, “the average 
rookie pool has declined relative to the per team salary cap from 
approximately seven percent in 1994 to just under four percent in 
2008.”477 
Ownership argues that wages at the top of the draft (i.e., 
players chosen in the top half of the first round) are growing at an 
increasingly disproportionate rate.478  Additionally, others argue 
that those teams in need of the most help are actually penalized by 
the draft, as those teams must surrender large amounts of money to 
unproven players.479  Critics of these large contracts argue that 
perhaps the immediate riches these agreements afford create 
troublesome and disruptive players.480  Some veteran players have 
even spoken out against the current system.481  However, none of 
these critics have pointed to any information more tangible than 
the data provided by the economists commissioned by the Union.  
The truth of the matter is negotiating salaries is part of the business 
of football.  It is also true that the average career of an NFL player 
might be less than a few seasons.482  Ownership and the Union 
 
 474 See id. 
 475 MURPHY & TOPEL, supra note 12, at 16. 
 476 Id. 
 477 Id.; see also Mike Florio, 2009 Rookie Pool Numbers, supra note 468.  
 478 Mike Florio, The Case for a True Rookie Wage Scale, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (May 
19, 2009), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/05/19/the-case-for-a-true-rookie-
wage-scale.  
 479 Id. 
 480 Id. 
 481 Mike Florio, Lorenzo Neal Doesn’t Like the Current Rookie Pay System, PRO 
FOOTBALL TALK (May 11, 2009), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/05/11/ 
lorenzo-neal-doesnt-like-the-current-rookie-pay-system. 
 482 NFL Hopeful FAQs, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflplayers.com/about-
us/FAQs/NFL-Hopeful-FAQs (last visited Jan. 3, 2010). 
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have already negotiated a rookie salary cap.483  A rookie does not 
possess much bargaining power because one way or another, the 
team can only pay its rookies what it is allotted by the League.484  
After the small percentage from the rookie wage pool is paid, a 
large amount of money is available under the cap to sign veteran 
players.485  Any complaints veteran players may have should be 
taken to their respective teams for not doling out the remainder of 
the allotted salary cap money to players.486  Veterans might not 
want to do that though, as a rookie salary may also inflate the 
market for veterans.487 
It is widely acknowledged that the League will implement a 
rookie wage scale as a means to divide rookies and veterans.488  
However, if the above-commissioned NFLPA report is taken under 
proper consideration,489 there is no reason for an intra-union 
dispute.  The real issue is whether the League can police Owners 
and front office personnel into drafting better, selecting smarter, 
and paying veteran players the entire remainder of the available 
space allotted to them under the salary cap. 
3. The League’s Pockets Keep Getting Deeper 
As discussed thus far, player salaries and benefits consist of 
roughly 60% of total League revenue.490  The CBA used to only 
include “Defined Gross Revenues,” which included a limited 
group of sources, but did include national television contracts, 
ticket sales, and NFL merchandise sales.  Ownership’s argument 
that it does not have a system that can financially work for players 
and Owners does not hold water when considering all of the 
revenue generated by advertising sales (which the players help 
generate as the end product of the game of football) and television 
 
 483 See Graziano, Crabtree Aside, supra note 470. 
 484 Id. 
 485 Mike Florio, The Case Against a True Wage Scale, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (May 26, 
2009), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/05/26/the-case-against-a-true-rookie-
wage-scale [hereinafter Florio, The Case Against].  
 486 Id. 
 487 Id. 
 488 Graziano, Crabtree Aside, supra note 470. 
489  Notably, the NFL has not provided data against this report. 
 490 MURPHY & TOPEL, supra note 12, at 12. 
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money, which is not contingent on a strike-free year or a 
lockout.491 
Companies spent a total of $2.616 billion on television 
advertising during the 2008 NFL season, which includes the 
regular season, playoffs, and Super Bowl.492  The NFL average 
ticket price has risen in the last year, up 4% to $75, despite the 
efforts of twenty-one of the League’s thirty-two teams to cut or 
sustain ticket prices this season.493  Only three of the NFL’s thirty-
two teams did not attempt a new advertising push or cut ticket 
prices this season.494  While teams are facing economic problems 
at the gate,495 these issues do not exist with the League’s television 
contracts.496 
The NFL and DirecTV signed a deal that sends $1 billion to the 
League every year, whether or not a game is played in 2011, the 
year when a strike or lockout might take place.497  Some have 
called this provision “lockout insurance.”498  In other words, the 
League has a strike fund in place, and a much bigger one than the 
Union has tried to accumulate.  The League also has enough 
money to wait for the deal it wants, instead of being under 
 
 491 See generally id. 
 492 NFL TV Advertisers Spent $2.6B Last Season, Led by A-B, U.S. Gov’t, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily. 
com/article/133374. 
 493 Larry Weisman, NFL Blitz: Ticket Prices and the Fan Cost Index, REDSKINS.COM 
(Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.redskins.com/gen/articles/NFL_Blitz__Holding_the_Line_ 
On_Ticket_Prices_51755.jsp. 
 494 Daniel Kaplan, Tough Ticket Market Forces NFL Teams to Be Creative, SPORTING 
NEWS TODAY, Sept. 10, 2009, at 11, available at http://today.sportingnews. 
com/sportingnewstoday/20090910/?pg=11&pm=1&u1=friend&sub_id=WKoP0PTTLltA
#pg11.  
 495 Daniel Kaplan, Up to 12 NFL Teams May Face Blackouts, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTSBUSINESS J., Aug. 31, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/63444. 
 496 Maury Brown, At Midseason, NFL TV Ratings Exceptionally Strong, BIZ OF 
FOOTBALL (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.bizoffootball.com/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=575:at-midseason-nfl-tv-ratings-exceptionally-strong&catid 
=40:television&Itemid=57.  
 497 Peter King, DirecTV Deal Is Lockout Insurance, SI.COM, Mar. 24, 2009, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/peter_king/03/24/meetings/index.html. 
 498 See id. But see Mike Florio, DirecTV “Guarantee” Would Likely Reduce Future 
Payments, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Mar. 24, 2009), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/ 
2009/03/directv-guarantee-would-likely-reduce-future-payments.php.  
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financial pressure to take any deal offered by the Union.499  During 
the last NFL strike, which occurred in 1987, the television 
networks dealt with replacement player games and scheduled 
alternative programming to fill the void.500  A strike in 2011 could 
exhibit similar problems.  The NFL has already signed deals 
extending its current television partnerships with FOX and CBS.501  
But for Ownership, it can just sit back and continue to count the 
money rolling in, even if ticket revenue might be down. 
Additionally, the League is engaging in behavior that it shied 
away from in previous years, such as advertising on player practice 
jerseys and signing deals with lotteries.502  Owners now also 
schedule events at their venues, from concerts to college football 
games, for additional revenue.503  The League also has the NFL 
Network and the Red Zone Channel, which provide additional 
cable revenue and advertising dollars.504  The NFL Network even 
broadcasts some NFL regular season games.  This is on top of the 
already-existing television relationships the League has with NBC, 
CBS, FOX, and ESPN, which paid each team close to $94 million 
last year alone.505  If all other shared national revenue is included 
in this figure, which includes road-game receipts and other league-
wide source revenues, each NFL team made about $147 million in 
 
 499 See NFL Team Valuations, FORBES.COM, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/ 
lists/2009/30/football-values-09_NFL-Team-Valuations_Value.html. 
 500 Clare Farnsworth, NFL Crossed the Line on Replacement Sunday, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 4, 2002, http://www.seattlepi.com/football/89817_replace04.shtml.  
 501 Associated Press, NFL Inks Broadcast Deals with CBS, FOX, CRAIN’S N.Y. 
BUSINESS.COM, May 19, 2009, http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20090519/ 
FREE/905199972. 
 502 See Packers Possibly Looking to Sell Ad Space on Practice Jerseys, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, June 4, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/ 
article/130699; see also Chad Millman, The NFL Isn’t a Hypocritical League on 
Gambling, It Just Lacks Serious Vision, ESPN.COM, May 28, 2009, http://sports.espn. 
go.com/espnmag/story?id=4211465. 
 503 See, e.g., Events Scheduled for Cowboy Stadium in Arlington, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, May 18, 2009, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/ 
cowboysstadium/stories/000000dnspocowboysstadiumevents.1d084b10.html. 
 504 See Press Release, DirecTV, NFL and DirecTV Extend NFL Sunday Ticket 
Agreement Through 2014 Season (Mar. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/global/article.jsp?assetId=P5590122.  
 505 Kurt Badenhausen, Michael K. Ozanian & Christina Settimi, Recession Tackles NFL 
Team Values, FORBES.COM, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/02/nfl-pro-
football-business-sportsmoney-football-values-09-values.html. 
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2008.506  With so much money in its collective hands, Ownership 
has neither any worries of economic failure nor of the effect of a 
work stoppage. 
The NFL is immensely popular and profitable for all sides 
involved.  “According to the Nielsen ratings, in 2008, five of the 
top 10 single-event television broadcasts were NFL-related.  
Because of this, television networks pay a premium for NFL 
content.”507  However, one must remember that players have to be 
playing in these contests in order for virtually all involved to enjoy 
those immense benefits.  Ownership, on the other hand, is the only 
outlier.  Under the above-mentioned contracts, the NFL is 
guaranteed some return even in the event of a strike or lockout 
because of these television contracts and other business 
ventures.508  These lucrative contracts give the League another 
reason to drag along negotiations as long as possible.  The longer 
negotiations take, the more pressure is on the Union to agree to a 
deal or face the prospect of losing part of a revenue sharing 
arrangement.  Since a deal was not reached between the NFL and 
the Union before March of 2010, the players will only enjoy 
whatever percentage of the salary “pie” they can get, as there will 
be no salary cap for the 2010 season.  The NFLPA will likely look 
to legal action to see that this “lockout insurance” is used for the 
common good of both sides.509   This may reduce the likelihood of 
a labor stoppage.510 
 
 506 Don Walker, Packers’ Net Profit: $5.2 Million, J. SENTINEL (Milwaukee, Wis.), July 
14, 2010, http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/sports/98421189.html. 
 507 Fisher, supra note 223. 
 508 King, supra note 497. 
509  Sean Leahy, NFLPA Asks Arbitrator to Put NFL’s TV Money in Escrow in Event of 
2011 Lockout, USA TODAY, June 9, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ 
thehuddle/post/2010/06/nflpa-asks-arbitrator-to-put-nfls-tv-money-in-escrow-in-event-of-
2011-lockout/1; David Elfin, NFLPA Files Complaint over League’s Guaranteed TV 
Deals, NFLPLAYERS.COM (June 9, 2009), http://www.nflplayers.com/articles/cba-
news/nflpa-files-complaint-over-leagues-guaranteed-tv-deals. 
510  Sean Leahy, Analyst: NFLPA’s TV Complaint ‘Probably Reduces the Probability of 
a Lockout,’ USA TODAY, June 10, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/the 
huddle/post/2010/06/analyst-nflpas-tv-complaint-probably-reduces-the-probability-of-a-
lockout/1. 
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Ownership has taken the position that the current financial 
structure does not work.511  However, when presented with the 
very same information that the League says the Union has as part 
of its commissioned economic report, it called it “fiction.”512  The 
Union has in turn asked for audited financial statements of the 
NFL’s thirty-two teams to determine what, if any, part of the 
current financial structure is not working.513  The League has 
refused any such request.514  The NFL’s position regarding a 
rookie wage scale is purely based on an interest to remove any 
bargaining power from the top-tier rookies and to displace the 
solidarity of the Union.515  A pool of money is already set aside for 
rookies and has no effect on veteran salaries.516  The only agents 
affecting veteran salaries are the NFL teams themselves, as many 
teams are withholding some of the 96% of the pie left for veterans 
after rookies claim a miniscule 4% of the total cap space.517 
4. The League Was Dragging Out Negotiations to Free Itself 
from Antitrust Law 
The League may have been dragging out negotiations in the 
hope that it would receive a favorable decision in the American 
Needle v. National Football League518 case, which could have 
eliminated one of the Union’s negotiating tactics.  Ownership had 
an incentive to drag out negotiations in order to both pad its 
lockout fund and potentially gain a tactical advantage in 
negotiations.  The League is already generating a steady stream of 
revenues, with more already in place in the event of a strike or 
lockout.519  Due to its growing pockets, the NFL can drag 
 
 511 Jeff Levine, All Signs Point to NFL Work Stoppage in 2011, BIZ OF FOOTBALL (Jan. 
8, 2010), http://www.bizoffootball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article 
&id=595:all-signs-point-to-nfl-work-stoppage-in-2011&catid=44:articles-and-opinion& 
Itemid=61. 
 512 Goodell: Union Report Inaccurate, supra note 458.  
 513 Florio, Union Poses, supra note 459.  
 514 Id. 
 515 See Graziano, Crabtree Aside, supra note 470. 
 516 Florio, The Case Against, supra note 485. 
 517 Id. 
 518 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 519 See, e.g., King, supra note 497. 
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negotiations out for a significant period of time and never produce 
the information the Union has requested.    
 If the NFL had successfully persuaded the Supreme Court that 
it functioned as a single entity, the League would have become 
exempt from antitrust scrutiny, thereby making antitrust law 
inapplicable.  If this occurred, the NFLPA would have been 
foreclosed from decertifying and filing an antitrust lawsuit like it 
did in 1993.520  This occurrence would have then only left the 
Union with the option of using labor law to come to an agreement.  
Luckily, the NFL was unable to convince the Supreme Court that 
its teams operated as a single entity, in “complete unity of 
interest”521 with objectives that are in common.522  Instead the 
Court definitely ruled against providing the NFL any type of labor 
exemption.523  
If the NFL was dragging its feet in negotiations in order to see 
if American Needle would provide it with an improved bargaining 
position, the League’s conduct amounts to merely going through 
the motions of bargaining with no intent to come to an agreement.  
Thus, in this situation, the NFLPA may contend that the NFL and 
its thirty-two teams are not bargaining in good faith.524 
 
520  Jeff Levine, High Court to Hear NFL Antitrust Case, Could Lead to Huge Victory 
for League, BIZ OF FOOTBALL (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.bizoffootball.com/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=461:high-court-to-hear-nfl-antitrust-
case-could-lead-to-huge-victory-for-league&catid=34:nfl-news&Itemid=53. 
521  Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
522  Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212. 
523  The Court opined that the League’s teams “compete with one another, not only on 
the playing field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial 
and playing personnel” and specific to the American Needle case, “the teams compete in 
the market for intellectual property.” See id. at 2212–13.  
524  For the NFL, waiting to meaningfully negotiate with the Union until American 
Needle was decided was worth risking a possible ULP filing because of the relatively 
short career span of the average NFL player. See Dan Raley, New NFL Goal: A Longer 
Life, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 9, 2008, http://www.seattlepi.com/football/ 
362412_nflhealth09.html (noting that the average career for an NFL player is three and a 
half seasons).  If the League was granted an antitrust exemption, it could have drastically 
dragged out negotiations for years and decimated the PA’s membership.  Similar to the 
rationale of the NHL players who would not present a united front in exchange for 
potentially sacrificing multiple seasons of hockey, if the average life of an NFL player is 
around three and a half years, that player does not have the luxury of waiting out a 
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VI. PREDICTIONS—LOCKOUT SEEMS IMMINENT 
The rhetoric of both the NFL and NFLPA is intensifying.  
Judging from the behavior of the parties, it appears that both sides 
have no problem dealing with an uncapped 2010 season in 
preparation of a prolonged labor stoppage.525  The pace of 
negotiations has slowed.526  The NFL was content to take a wait- 
and-see approach with American Needle and engage in real 
negotiations only after the Supreme Court rendered its decision.  
Even though the League did not receive a favorable ruling, the 
NFLPA is convinced that Ownership will lock the players out.527  
“Our players know the [L]eague has hired the guy [attorney Bob 
Batterman] that engineered the NHL lockout,” Smith said.  “They 
look at these new TV contracts that guarantee payment even in the 
event of a lockout.”528  Thus, Smith surmises, the NFL hopes to 
implement a strategy similar to that engineered by Batterman 
during the NHL lockout and wait for the NFLPA to break 
solidarity all while relying on its guaranteed contracts from 
sponsors such as DirecTV.529  The only difference with this labor 
stoppage is that this time, the NFL hoped to avoid the possibility of 
Union decertification and antitrust scrutiny through a favorable 
 
lockout that could last multiple years in duration.  NFL players are more likely to 
acquiesce to Ownership’s demands in a long labor dispute because of their relatively 
short playing career.  This short playing career would make it difficult for the Union to 
present a united front to the League, thereby giving the NFL the upper hand in 
negotiating a management-friendly CBA.  
 525 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 526 Peter King recently wrote, “I hear progress is virtually nil and the players are 
pessimistic that a new deal will get done in time for them to play the 2011 season.” 
Cowboys Owner Jerry Jones Discusses NFL Economics on “FNIA,” STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 28, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/ 
article/135834.  
 527 NFLPA Director Smith Convinced Players Will Be Locked Out in 2011, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Aug. 17, 2009, available at http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d 
5d811f51d2&template=without-video-with-comments&confirm=true.  
 528 Dan Graziano, DeMaurice Smith: NFL Intent on Locking Out Players, NFL 
FANHOUSE (June 15, 2009), http://nfl.fanhouse.com/2009/06/15/demaurice-smith-nfl-
intent-on-locking-out-players. 
 529 See Futterman, supra note 411. 
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American Needle decision.530  However, the NFL was unable to 
convince the Supreme Court to grant such a tactical advantage. 
Since the League cannot stand behind American Needle in 
order to elude an antitrust challenge, the PA has begun to seek 
authorization from the membership to decertify as a union if 
necessary.531  Decertification of the union would immediately 
allow the Players as individuals to challenge in court any action by 
the Owners that alter the current labor system.532  Suing under 
antitrust law would also allow the Players to seek treble damages 
from the NFL.  However, decertifying as a union could also have a 
chilling effect on negotiations.533  It may also lead some to 
characterize such a decision as a “sham” decertification534 intended 
to circumvent the labor exemption to antitrust law.  Although 
decertification is still possible, Smith insists that his players want 
to negotiate a new deal, starting with addressing the financials.535  
However, in reality, financial disclosure is not going to occur as 
the NFL is not alleging an inability to pay and is most likely not in 
a hurry to negotiate a successor agreement. 
Both sides do not seem greatly concerned about how the NHL 
lockout did serious damage to the goodwill of professional hockey.  
It is unclear whether the parties are truly ready to sacrifice labor 
peace for the uncertainty of a prolonged labor conflict, especially 
 
 530 Liz Mullen, NFL Filing in American Needle Case Could Affect Labor Relations, 
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.sportsbusiness 
daily.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=sbd.main&ArticleID=134981. 
531  Liz Mullen, Union Seeks Authority to Decertify, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS 
J., Sept. 13, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/66916 
[hereinafter Mullen, Union Seeks Authority]. 
532    Id. 
533   See Daniel Kaplan, NFL’s Goodell Says NFLPA’s Move to Decertify Could Hamper 
Labor Talks, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Sept. 13, 2010, 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=tdi.closingBell&utm_source=
cb_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=headlineslink&utm_campaign=cbemail. 
534    Mullen, Union Seeks Authority, supra note 531.  
 535 “The players of the National Football League are still in the dark 
about why this deal isn’t good enough,” Smith said.  “And the easiest 
way to demonstrate any problem with the deal is the way any 
business in America demonstrates it: They turn over what the profit 
or loss numbers are.  And if there’s a problem with the model, we’ll 
fix it.”  
Brown & Prine, supra note 203. 
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after the NHL’s recent disastrous labor dispute.  While 
professional football enjoys more widespread popularity than the 
NHL,536 it is reasonable to imagine that a protracted labor dispute 
would similarly damage the profitability and popularity of the 
NFL.  The current compositions of the NFL and the Union are not 
radically different from their respective predecessors.  This 
bargaining relationship is decades long and possesses an emotional 
history checkered with heated conflicts.537  Given this past, one 
struggles to understand why either side wants to reopen the bitter 
feelings of the past by waiting till the expiration of the current 
CBA.  The current CBA was responsible for billions of dollars in 
profits for both Owners and players alike,538  but this Agreement is 
largely considered broken due to irreconcilable differences 
between the parties.  It remains to be seen whether an uncapped 
and unfloored 2010 season will allow the parties to mend a 
relationship that was relatively calm throughout the late 1990s 
until mid-2008.539  However, labor peace, when one examines the 
bargaining history of the parties, has been the exception rather than 
the rule.  Taking this into consideration, the authors expect the 
NFL to initiate a lockout, signaling the beginning of a protracted 
dispute that could be significant in duration. 
An intense and long-lasting labor stoppage could also 
significantly impact the other major U.S. sports.  As one team 
executive posits, “[i]f the NFL has substantial labor issues, there 
will be a dramatic ripple effect—good and bad dependent on where 
you sit—throughout the sports industry.”540  Thus, the events in the 
coming year between the NFL and NFLPA will bear significant 
consequences for virtually all of professional sports.  
 
 
 536 Curtis Eichelberger, NHL Borrows from NFL as It Pursues Bigger TV Contract 
(Update 1), BLOOMBERG, May 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601109&sid=aGY7pu.INAhA.  
 537 See Goplerud, supra note 86, at 13–33. 
 538 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 539 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 540 The Sports Business Year That Was: A Look Back at ’09, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=sbd.all&ArticleID=135672 (citing Atlanta Braves Executive Vice 
President, Derek Schiller). 
